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ABSTRACT 
The use of  money in congressional elections will 
be the principal i ssue of this thes i s .  The money decides 
who will mount a serious contest and who will not . In 
determining the effect of  money in congressional races , i t  
is hypothes ized that campaign s pending has a much greater 
effect on the challenger ' s  chances of winning than it does 
on the incumbent ' s .  
One of the many implications of  this thesis is that 
people and groups determine how well a candidate will do on 
election day . Such topics as  long term trends in the Hous e ,  
congress ional competition , voting behavior , conservative 
and liberal political action groups and why people contribute 
to their congressional candidates are examined. The dif­
ferent methods that congressional incumbents use to fend 
off wel l - f inanced and executed challenges against their 
seats are examined . 
In the final chapter , a statistical analys is i s  
emp loyed which updates Gary C .  Jacobson ' s  multivariate 
analysis on congress ional spending. Using his methodology, 
209 congressional districts in the 1980 election are ana­
lyzed. The results obtained are generally consistent with 
those of Jacobson. Challenger ' s  expenditures are found to 
be the most important in determining the outcome of an 
election, Incumbents gauge their spending to that of  the 
challenger . In addition, the challenger ' s  party strength 
2 
is an important factor affecting election results . However , 
the results of this study indicate a smaller increase in 
the challenger ' s  vote due to an increase in spending than 
does Jacobson ' s  study . 
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INTRODUCTION 
I t  is my desire to update and replicate Gary C .  
Jacobson ' s  study of the impact of money in congressional 
elections for 209 congressional districts . The principal 
argument of this thesis is that money is one of the chief 
variables that influence congressional elections . I will 
test the hypothes i s  that campaign spending by the challenger 
has a much greater impact on the e lection than money spent 
by the incumbent . I hope to demonstrate that the incumbent 
adj usts his spending to the perceived threat the challenger 
poses by mobilizing resources against him in the campaign .  
I will also review the literature on recent trends in 
congres s ional elections , why people and organizations make 
financial contributions , and how much money i s  contributed.  
vi 
CHAPTER I 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
LONG TERM TRENDS IN CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS 
The principal trends in congressional elections from 
1962-70 i s  that 15 to 20 percent of  House elections are now 
' marginal ' ,  that i s ,  where the winning candidate received 
less than 55 percent of the vot e .  In about 7 0  t o  1 0 0  dis-
tricts out of the total 435 is there little if  any chance 
that the incumbent party will los e .  In congressional elec-
tions from 1956 to 1968 , at  least 90 percent of the incum­
bents in the House were re-elected. 1 
Since 1849 to 1965 there has been a decline in the 
number of  first term members in the House ( 5 3 . 1  to 2 0 . 9) , 
except for the 37. 2 percent turnover in the Roosevelt land­
s lide of 1932.  In addition, the mean terc of  service in 
years has continued to grow from 1849 , which was 1 . 9  percent , 
to 5.65 percent in 1963. 2 F inal ly , Lhe percentag e of senior 
1william J .  Keefe , Partie·s ,  Politic·s ,  and Publ.ic 
Policy in America , 2nd e d .  (Hinsdale , IL: Dryden Press ,  Inc . , 
1976), pp.  32-4. 
2 Nelson W .  Polsby , "The Institut ionalizat ion of the 
U . S .  House of  Representatives , "  American Po.litica·1 Science 
Review 62  ( 1968) : 146-48 ; Morr i s  P. Fiorina , David W. Rohde , 
and Peter Wissel , "Historical Change in House Turnover , "  in 
Con ress in Chan e :  Evolution and Reform, ed.  Norman J .  
Ornstein New Praeger Pu i s  ers ,  Inc . , 1975) , pp . 
2 9 - 3 2 .  
1 
congressmen (10 terms or more) has risen from 2 . 8  percent of 
the House in 1911, to 20 percent in 1971. 3 
As Charles O .  Jones' article on inter-party competi-
tion for Congress states, competition between candidates is 
1 d h d . d l  . .  h 4 A ow an t e tren is towar ess competition t an more .  t 
present , incumbents tend to win five consecutive elections 
2 
in 70 to 80 percent of congressional districts. In addition, 
seat switching from Republican to Democrat is also diminishing. 
Mayhew concludes that there are more ' marginal '  out­
comes in non-incumbent districts than in districts with an 
incumbent running. A 'marginal ' outcome is defined as one 
in which the Democratic candidate received 45 perc.ent to 54.  9 
percent of the vote.  In the nine elections from 1956 to  197 2 ,  
29 percent to 50 . 1  percent o f  the elections in non-incumbent 
districts fell in the ' marginal '  range . This leads Mayhew to 
conclude "that House elections without incumbents running 
5 tend to be closely contested . "  In districts with incumbents 
running , the number of ' marginal ' elections decreased from 
about 80 in 1956 to approximately 3 0  in 1972, In open dis-
tricts ,  the number of 'margina l '  elections remained relatively 
3charles S .  Bullock III , "House Careerists:  Changing 
Patterns of Longevity and Attrition , "  American Politic.al Science 
Review 66  ( 1972 ) : pp . 1295-1300 . 
4charles O .  Jones, "Inter-Party Competition for Con­
gressional Se�ts , "  Western Political Quarter·ly 17 (1964) : pp . 
465-466. 
5David R. Mayhew, "Congressional Elections: The Case 
of the Vanishing Marginals , "  Pol i ty 6 (1974) : pp , 298-301.  
3 
stable , between 15 and 25 . This also leads Mayhew to conclude 
that it has become easier for an incumbent to be re-elected. 6 
Further analysis by Cover and Mayhew states that "it  
takes a big vote swing to  defeat very many incumbents when not 
many are marginal to begin with. 117 Such was the case of the 
post -Watergate election of 197 4 ,  and the 1980 landslide of 
Ronald Reagan , resulting in 3 6  and 33 seat losses respectively . 
But the question must be asked, why is there a reduc-
tion in 'marginality ' ?  If we examine critical points in a 
congressman ' s  career , it should show that incumbency is an 
electoral advantage . A good example would be to look at the 
incumbent ' s  first and final re-election bid.  We would expect 
that i f  incumbency i s  important , we would see the vote percent-
ages at the end of his freshman term to go up . This phenomena , 
according to Cover and Mayhew, is called the " sophomore surge . 118 
The second point to examine is when the incumbent 
retires .  He expect the incurnbent ' s  successor will not do as 
well as the incumbent in his final re-election bid.  Cover and 
Mayhew' s  data on "sophomore surge" and "retirement slump" for 
H ouse member s ,  1962-1974 , found the av erag e mean ' 'sophon ore 
6Ibid . , p .  303 . 
7 Albert D.  Cover and David R.  Mayhew, "Congre s s ional 
Dynamic s  and the Decline o f  Competitive Congressional Elec­
tion , "  in Congress Recons ide·red ,  ed.  Lawrence E .  Dodd and 
Bruce I .  Oppenheimer (New York: Praeger Publishers , Inc . , 
1977) , pp . 55-56 . 
8 Ibid . , pp . 59-60 . 
surge" was 4 . 5  percent adjusted and the mean "retirement 
slump" (percent of party vote fal l  off inunediately after 
incumbent ' s  retirement) was -6 percent. 9 
It is of particular interest that first term repre­
sentatives running for re-electi on did better than their 
older counterparts in a trend situation .  In the 1974 elec-
4 
tion Walter Burnham pointed to the fact that Republican first 
termers showed little pro-Democratic swing as a group ; actu-
ally they improved their position .  The mean percentage Demo-
cratic vote in Republican districts for first termers decreased 
s lightly,  fr om 43 . 4 percent in 197 2  to 43. 2 percent in 197 4 .  
However ,  the mean percentage Democratic vote in Republican 
districts for old incumbent s  increased fr om 3 3 . 6  percent in 
197 2 ,  to 44. 2 percent in 19 7 4 .  Looking a t  the Democratic dis-
trict s ,  firs t  termers '  percentage vote increased from 6 0 . 8  
percent in 19 7 2 ,  t o  7 3 . 1  percent in 19 74. Old incumbents '  
vote percentage increased from 65 . 8  percent to 70 . 7  percent . 
In 197 6 ,  forty-eight of the forty-nine Democrats elected to 
Republican seats in 1974 won second terms . Seventy-two of 
the sev enty- four freshman Democr a t s  who sought re-elect ion 
10  won . 
9rbid . ,  pp.  50-60.  
10walter Dean Burnham, "Insulation and Responsiveness 
in Congressional Elections , "  Pol it ical -Science· Quarterly 90 
( 19 75 ) : p .  420 . 
WHAT HAS HAPPENED TO CONGRESSIONAL COMPETI TION? 
There has been extensive research in the area of 
congressional c ompetition ,  and there are many explanations 
as to why it has declined. These explanations are imp ortant 
to us , because they directly affect how we are to assess the 
role of money , or c ongressional financing, in elections . 
One theory proposed by Edward Tufte suggests that 
5 
there was a drop in the "swing ratio" (the percentage increase 
in populati on vote) . This , according to Tufte is due t o  gerry-
r:landering : 
A maj or element in the job security of 
incumbents is  their ability to exert 
significant control over the drawing 
of district boundaries . . .  reappor­
tionment rulings have given incumbents 
new opportunities to construct secure 
districts for themselve s ,  leading to a 
reduction in turnover that is  in turn , 
reflected in the sharply reduced1!wing ratio of the last few elections . 
He goes on to show that Senate competition where no redis­
tricting occurred after the reapportionment was instituted , 
stayed relatively stable between . 13 to . 15 .  Conversely , 
House margins gradually decreased from . 20 to . 13 . 12 
A second position held by Walter Burnham contradicts 
Tufte ' s  claim of gerrymanderinr, as the most important variable 
in the "swing ratios" . He points to " . . .  changes in mass 
voting behavior . . .  saliency , access to mass c ommunication 
11Edward R. Tufte , "The Relationship Between Seats and 
Votes in Two-Party Systems , "  American Political Science Review 
6 7  ( 1973) : p .  5 5 1 .  
12Ibid . , p .  553 . 
which in turn affects large blocks of the electorate . . .  
vote for incumbent s ,  whatever is happening elsewhere on the 
national or state ticket . "13  
6 
A third position by Mayhew on the decline suggests 
that incumbents are advertising themselves better through 
franking . ' Credi t  claiming ' by the incumbent for grants - in­
aid programs to his district and his ability to gauge public 
op inion on certain i s sues have lead to highly accurate polling 
by the incumbents ,  all of which have enhanced the incumbent's 
ability to hold an edge over the challenger. 14 
But the trouble with Tufte ' s  hypothesis , according to 
John Ferejohn , i s  that he failed to consider swing ratios in 
districts that were not gerrymandered. The data he presented 
showed both gerrymandered and non-gerrymandered districts to 
h 1 . 1 . ·1 d 1 . 15 ave re ative y simi ar ec ine s .  Alternately,  tlayhew' s  
hypothesis  does not adequately explain i t ,  because of "little 
if any increase in the gap between name recognition level s  of 
incumbents and challengers . "16 
13walter Dean Bu rnham, "Commu nicat ions," American 
Political Science Review 68 ( 1974): p. 210 . 
14navid R.  Mayhew, "Congre s s i onal Elections : The Case 
of the Vanishing Marginals , "  Polity 6 ( 1974) : pp.  298 - 30 1 .  
15John A. Ferej ohn , "On the Decline of Competition in 
Congressional Elections , "  American Political Science Review 
7 1  ( 19 7 7 ) :  pp . 166-69 . 
16rbid . ,  p .  170.  
The rest of the literature i s  divided into,  " ( l) 
changes in the behavior of the voters , ( 2 )  changes in the 
behavior of the incumben t ,  or (3)  s ome combination of the 
two. " 1 7  In the case of number three it i s  debated which 
caused the other.  In this thesis I will l ook at the 
behavior of the incur:ibent ,  s ince he makes campaign f in an c e  
policy, which in turn reflects on the ' incumbency factor '  
to raise and spend money. 
7 
By examining changes in incumbency , Mayhew and others 
argue that the Congress i s  a self-sustaining body , with advant­
ages ( i . e . , franking , credit claiming , position taking) to 
help the membership stay in office . But these advantages 
such as ' credit claiming ' etc . , are used only to enhance con-
stituency suppor t ,  in effect to show that the incumbent is 
"personally responsible for causing the government ,  or some 
unit thereof , to do something that the actor considers des ir­
abl e .  "18  This in essence will cause his constituency to say 
we need to keep him around " s o  he can make pleasing things 
happen in the future. "19 This ,  according to Mayhew , is c om-
pletely obl ivious to what the e f f e c t ive impact of the legis­
lation will be in the future whether positive or negative. 20 
(New 
tion 
1 7Gary c. Jacobson, Money in Conrressi ·onal Elections 
Haven : Yale Univers ity Pre s s , 1980 , p .  5. 
18oavid R. Mayhew, Con9res s :  The Ele·ctorial Connec­
(New Haven : Yale University Pres s ,  1974) , p .  53. 
19Ibid . , p .  5 3 .  
ZOibid. , pp . 115 - 1 3 8 .  
8 
Another aspect of incumbency is  that party discipline 
in the Congress is at a minimum, as  can be seen by the recent 
Southern Democratic ' Boll Weevil Caucus ' in their efforts to 
support President Reagan ' s  1981 tax package. Leaders in both 
houses have counseled members to "vote their constituencies . "  
Party pressure to vote one way or another is at a minimum. 
Mayhew states , "in a good many ways the interesting division 
in congressional politics is  not between Democrats and Repub-
l icans , but between politicians in and out of office . . .  i t  
has the appearance of a cross-party conspiracy among incumbents 
to keep their jobs . "2 1  
In Richard Fenno' s  article , "U. S. House Members in 
Their Constitutencies , "  he portrays a congressman as trying 
to get across to his constituency that he is "j ust a person , "  
a person in whom you can put your trust. To gain this trus t ,  
Fenno stresses that three criteria must be met .  One is  quali� 
fication :  "I understand the job and I have the experience 
necessary to do a good job . " The second is identification :  
"I think the way you do and I care about the same thing you 
do . "  The third i s  a sense of empathy : "I can put myse lf in 
your shoes . "  In this dialogue , the incumbent ' s  per s onal 
character is pushed to the forefront rather than his political 
22 beliefs or goa l s .  
2 1Ibid. , p. 105 . 
22Richard F. Fenno, Jr . ,  "U . S . House Members in Their 
Constituencies : An Exploration , "  .Arnericah Polit .ical Science 
Review 7 1  (197 7 ) : p .  899 . 
But this pattern of incumbent behavior has been 
around long before the rise in incumbent security , so i t  
offers little in explaining it; what it does offer i s  some 
account ing of long term electoral succes s . 23 What has 
9 
changed is the perquisites a congres sman receives for trave l ,  
constituent communication, telephone , rents (office) , staff, 
not counting his franking privileges which amounts to more 
than $5 7 5 , 00 0 . 2
4 
A breakdown of this may be seen in Tab le 1 .  
Further increases may be seen from from the figures from 1971  
to  197 9 .  "Nearly all the perquis ites of members of Congress 
give incumbents certain campaign advantages over their chal-
lengers . . .  all  these services at the publ ic expense may 
improve the member ' s  chance of being re-elected . 1 25 
CONGRESSIONAL VOTING BEHAVIOR : PARTISAN FACTORS AT THE 
NATIOUAL AND DISTRICT LEVELS 
I t  has frequently been pointed out that the national 
congress ional partisan vote fluctuates during Presidential 
years and swings back to a stable pattern in midterm year s .  
2 3  Gary C .  Jacobson , �· ci t . ,  p .  6 .  
24congressional Quarterly , Inc . ,"  'Inside Con·gress 
(Washington , D .  C . :  Congress ional Quarterly, Inc . ,  Oct . 
1979), p .  122 . 
25congress ional Quarterly , Inc . , Pay , Pe·rquls·i·tes , 
Patronage : Guide to Conyress (Washington, D. C . :  Congres­
sional Quarterly ,  Inc . , 980), p .  476 . 
TABLE 1 
Annual Al lowances for Representatives : 1979 Data 
Member ' s  Salary 
Personal Staff Salary (18 aides) 
Travel ,  Uashington/District 
Stationary 
Postage 
Constituent Communications 
$ 6 0 , 662 
$288 , 15 6  
32 round trips 
6 , 500 
1 , 140 (1st class) 
5 , 000 (news letters , 
10 
questionnaires) 
Telephone 
Franking 
Washington Office Expense : 
Rent 
Equipment (purchased) 
Equipment (rented) 
District Office Expense : 
Rent 
Equipment (purchased--rented) 
Official Expenses 
15 , 000 X the highest long 
dis tance rate per minute 
6 X the # of addresses in 
member ' s  district per year 
$ 10, 480 
$ 
$ 
5 , 500 
9 , 000 
$ 18 , 000 
$ 1 9 , 500 
$ 2 , 000 
Al lowances for Representatives from 1971-79 
Salary 
Staff 
Stat ionary 
Franking 
1 9 7 1  1979 
$ 42,500 
$ 130 , 000 
$3 , 2 00 
--
$ 66, 662 
$288 , 15 6  
$6 , 500 
( 1968 e s t . , 178 million pieces; 19 7 9 ,  3 7 8  
mil lion pieces) These figures are for the 
entire Congres s .  
Source : Pay, Perquisites , Patronage, Guide to Congress , 2nd ed . 
Congressional Quarterly ,  p .  476. 
11  
Since the congress ional vote returns to normal after a Presi-
dential surge , it has been noted the Pres ident ' s  party loses 
seats at midterrn. 2 6  As Angus Campbell explains , the highly 
electric atmosphere of Presidential elections brings out a 
large percentage of marginal voters who are influenced by 
th h t t . f d b h . 2 7  e s o r  erm partisan orces generate y t e campaign . 
At the district leve l ,  Donald E .  Stoke s ,  in his 
analysis of variance procedur e ,  e s t imated the percentage of 
variation caused by ' National ' ,  'State ' ,  and ' Cons tituency ' 
factors during a ten-year period. The inter-election vote 
variance that he found for the three are . 32 ,  . 19 , . 49 (out 
of 1 . 00) , respectively. 28 He found that half of the variance 
in the vote i s  explained by ' cons t i tuency' factors, parties , 
local i s sue s ,  and changes in the district s '  partisanship . 
This has led to the recent phenomenon o f  partisan defections , 
or the eroding of party l ine s .  
26Donald E .  Stoke s ,  "A Variance Component Model of 
Political Effects , "  in John M. Clauch ( e d . ) ,  Mathematical 
Applications in Political Science (Dallas : Arnold Foundation , 
1965), pp . 61-85. 
2 7Angus Campbe l l ,  "Surge and Decl ine: 
Electoral Change , "  in Angus Campbel l ,  e t .  a l . , 
the Political Order (New York : John Wiley and 
pp . 40-62. 
A Study of 
Elections and 
Sons , 1966), 
28Donald E .  Stokes ,  "Parties and the Nationalization 
o f  Electoral Forces , "  in William N .  Chambers and Walter Burnham, 
eds . , The Ameri can Partb System (New York : Oxford University 
Press , 1967) ,  pp . 182-2 2. 
.. 
12 
Table 2 presents data on changes in partisan at ti-
tudes over time. From 1952 to 1964 a relat ive stable situa-
tion occurred;  about a third of the population was strong 
partisan and a s l ightly larger group was weak partisan, while 
about a fifth were independent . Although there were wide 
swing s in 1956 and 1960 in the Eisenhower and Johnson sweep s ,  
the data represents convincing evidence to the continuity of 
partisanship . 2 9  However , from 1964 through 1974 the strong 
partisan relat ionship dropped and independent part isanship 
rose . By 1974 one in four people were considered strong 
partisan while 38 percent were independen t .  As Nie , e t .  al . ,  
put i t ,  the correlat ion between party identification and 
House vote in 1956 was . 72 ,  by 1 9 7 2  it was . 55 . These figures 
. d. 1 . f ff. l 0 • 30 in icate a c ear erosion o party a i iation. 
In John Ferejohn ' s  article ,  he showed that between 
1958 and 1970 there was a decline in the percentage of voters 
who voted for their own party ' s  candidate .  According to Fere­
j ohn, the best indicator was those people who knew neither 
candidate but declared their party affiliation . In this group , 
the percentages who voted for their own party's candidate 
2 9norman H. Nie , Sidney Verba , and John 
The Changing American Voter ( Cambridge , Mas s . :  
versity Pres s ,  1976), pp . 47 - 73.  
3 olbid . , pp . 49 - 5 2  . 
R. Petrock, 
Harvard Uni-
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13 
Table 2 Partisan Affiliation, 1952-1974 
43 
Weak partisans � •• 
41 41 • • • ••• 41 
• • . • • •
• 
39 38 • • • •• 40 • • • • 39 • 39 • • .... • • • • • ••• • •• 3J3. �.. J .. . � ...... � _..,.,.,, 39 � - _...,.. 38 ;�. 36 
37 37 37 \ .. 
' 33 
..... � 
1956 
Strong 
20 
partisans _,/' \ \ 29 
• .ar;;._.,_7.,. '--" -
26 26 
1958 1960 1962 1964 1966 1968 1970 1972 1974 
Year 
Source: Nie, Verba and Petrocik, The Changing &�erican Voter, Harvard 
University Press, 1976, page 49. 
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decreased from a high of 95 . 1  percent in 1958 to a low of 
81 . 7  percent in 1968 and recovered to 89 . 8  percent in 1 9 7 0 . 31 
In Cove r ' s  study, he extends the fact that "about 
three-fourths of all defections have come from the chal lenger ' s  
party . This indicates an important shift in mass electorial 
behavio r .  Not only are partisan defect ions becoming more 
common , but they are falling into a heavily pro- incumbent 
pattern . 1132 He went on to state , "since 1972 about half of 
those identifying with the challenger ' s  party have deserted 
their party ' s  congressional candidate in contested elect ions 
involving an incumbent . 113 3  But as Cover points out , "the 
loosening of party loyalty may help the incumbent , but the 
decline of partisanship does not necessarily have this effect . 113
4 
Another reason behind the exp lanation favoring the incumbent 
is the amount of information reaching the electorate. 
In their famous study of voting in the 1958 congres-
sional election , Stokes and Miller described "saliency of a 
candidate" as one of the most critical factors i f  he is to 
gain support from the opposite party . "However , little the 
pub l i c  may know of those s eeking office , any information at 
3 1John A. Ferej ohn , "On the Decline of Competit ion in 
Congressional Elections, II American Political" sc·i·enc·e Review 6 7 
(19 7 3) : p .  1 7 3 . 
32Albert D .  Cover , "One Good Term Deserves Another : 
The Advantage of Incumbency in Congressional Elections , "  
American Journal of Political sc·ience 2 1  (197 7): p .  535 . 
3 3Ibid. , p .  535 . 
34Ibid. , p .  532 . 
15 
all about the rival party ' s  candidate creates the possibility 
of a choice deviating from their party . 1 135 As seen in Table 
3 ,  if no information was available on either candidate , party 
line voting was as sured. Even greater degrees of di fference 
can be seen for information on voters "Own Party Candidate . "  
It can also be interpreted that i f  voters know only the 
"Other Party Candidate , "  almost half can be induced to cast 
t t h . 1. 36 s b a vo e con rary to t eir party ine . u sequent surveys 
have confirmed their findings ; Table 4 displays the updated 
version. 
TABLE 3 
Percentage Voting for Own Party Candidate and Other 
Party Candidate for House in 1958 , 
by Sal iency of Candidates in Contested Districts 
Voter Was Aware of 
Own Party Other Party 
Both Candidate Candidate 
Voted for. Candidates Only Only 
Candidate ( N  = 196) (N = 166) ( N  = 68) 
Of own party 83 98 6 0  
Of other party 1 7  2 40 
Total 100 100 100 
Neither 
Candidate 
( N  = 368) 
92 
8 
100 
Source : Donald E .  Stokes and Warren E .  Miller , "Party Govern­
ment and the Sal iency of Congres s "  in Elections and 
Political Orde r ,  John Wiley and Sons , Inc . , 1966, 
p .  205. 
35Donald E .  Stokes and Warren E .  Miller , "Party Govern­
ment and the Saliency o f  Congres s," in Election:s ·and the Poli­
tical Order (New York : John Wiley and Son s , Inc . , 1966) , p .  
198. 
36Ibid. , p .  205 . 
T.A..BLE 4 
Effects of Candidate Recall on Partisan Defections 
in House Elections 
Percentage Who Both 
Defected. Candidates 
House 
Elections 
1958 1 7  
( 196) a 
1966 19 
( 198) 
1968 2 3  
( 303)  
1970 24 
( 152)  
1972 23 
( 1 5 1 )  
1974 2 9  
(281) 
Voter Recalled 
Own 
Candidate 
2 
( 166) 
4 
(98) 
5 
( 9 7 )  
1 
( 148) 
7 
( 100) 
1 
(154 ) 
Other 
Candidate 
40 
(68) 
6 6  
( 41) 
5 1  
( 5  7 )  
5 7  
( 3 7 )  
62 
(26)  
5 8  
( 7 9 )  
Neither 
Candidate 
8 
(368) 
14 
( 2 3 1) 
19 
( 2 6 7 )  
1 3  
( 2 5 6 )  
2 1  
(242 )  
15 
( 3 74) 
a Number of cases from which percentages were computed , 
The 1974 sample is weighted. 
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Source : 1958-19 7 0 ,  Rober t B .  Arseneau and Raymond Wolfinge r ,  
"Voting Behavior in Congressional Elections" (Pre­
sented to the 1973 Annual Meeting of the Amer ican 
Polit ical Science Association, New Orleans , Sep t .  4- 8 ,  19 7 3 ,  p .  14 ; 1972 and 1974 , CPS American 
National Election Studies . In G�ry C .  Jacobson , 
Money in Congressional Elections , p .  16 . 
The relative importance of information available to 
the voters is crucial because of the connection between what 
they know about the candidates and how they will mark their 
ballo t s .  Partisan defection was shown by a number o f  studies 
to be directly related to di fferential 'awareness' of candi­
dates . Candidate familiarity provides s ome insight into why 
incumbents do much better in elections than non- incumbents . 
The electorate are much more likely to know the incumbent 
than the non- incumbent ,  as can be seen by Ferejohn ' s  work 
in Table 5 . 3 7  
TABLE 5 
Percentage of Voters Who are Aware of House Candidates 
in Contested Districts 
Incumbent 
1958 5 7 . 6  
( 7 38)a 
1964 6 3 . 0  
(856) 
1966 55 . 9  
(533) 
1968 6 3 . 7 
( 7 03) 
1970 54. 7  
(548) 
1 9 7 2  5 0 . 0  
(498) 
1974 5 7 . 2  
(856) 
Non incumbent 
38 . 0  
( 947) 
3 9 . 8  
(920) 
37 . 6  
( 7 03) 
46 . 5  
(861) 
3 1 .  3 
(630) 
30 . 9  
( 718) 
32 . 2  
(1230) 
aThe number in parenetheses is the number of voters in 
districts with an incumbent running (column 1) or a non­
incumbent running (column 2) . . 
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Source : John A .  Ferejohn, "On the Decline of Competition in 
Congressional Elections ,"  American Polit ica1 Science 
Review 7 1  ( 1 9 7 7) :  p .  170 , and 1972 and 1974, CPS 
Surveys . 
3 7John A .  Ferej ohn , �· cit . , p .  1 7 0 .  
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NAME RECOGNITION 
Name recognition has not been given much attention 
in the literature , but there are some studies that do concern 
name familiarity and reca l l .  
The early study o f  Stokes and Miller in the 1958 mid-
term congre s s ional election hypothesized that the voters pre-
ferred incumbents to challengers b ecause they were more likely 
to know their names . They presented the idea that in low 
s t imulus elections , information about a candidate will be 
perceived as pos itive , in affect attracting support from the 
oppsoing party. 38 But in their attempt to assess name famili-
arity , they did not determine what or how much impact i t  had 
on the incumbent effect . 
Ferej ohn did test the name familiarity hypothesis; 
however he found the incumbent had only a s light name advant-
age over the challenger . In addition , when he controlled for 
name fami liarity using multiple regress ion analysis in the 
1966-68 election , he found that i t  had a s ignificant effect 
on vot ing decis ion ; "voters were apparently using incumbency 
as a voting cue whether or not they could recall the name o f  
h . b d . d . h . . . . 113 9  t e incum ent can i a t e  in t e interview situation. He 
concluded that name fami liarity does not completely explain 
why incumbency is generally an advantage . 
38nonald E .  Stokes and Warren E. Miller , 2£.• cit . , 
p .  205 . 
39 John Ferej ohn , ££_. cit . , pp. 
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Alan J .  Abramowitz counters these areuments by main­
taining that , "the incumbency effect reflects an incumbent's 
reputation among his constituent s .  The ir satis faction with 
his performance , not the familiarity of his name , determines 
how much value a congre s sman derives from incumbency;"40 thus 
the reputation hypothesi s  surfaces . The constituency is 
looking at his record; if they are satisfied, they will vote 
for h im; i f  not , for the challenger. Name recall is j us t  a 
" threshold indicator. "  He found in the Lake County , Oregon, 
study of one district that respondents would offer opinions 
on how the incumbent was p erforming without being able to 
recall his name . Abramowitz concluded that the reputation 
of a congressman was based on his performance , personal quali-
t ie s , is sue position, and const ituency service , and performance 
was the most important factor in determining the voters willing-
1 .  41 ness to cross party 1nes .  
There are others (Mann , Mayhew , Downs , Converse) that 
have contributed to this body of knowledge , but a reasonable 
conclusion from these findings is that the more ' information' 
the electorate has about a candidate , the more variation in 
voter support .  The ' quantity'  of information--as well as the 
' quality1 of the candidate--may very wel l  decide the outcome 
40Alan J .  Abramowitz , "Name Famil iarity, Reputation, 
and the Incumbency Effect in a Congres s ional Elect ion , "  
Western Political Quarterly 28 ( 19 75):  p .  675.  
4 1rbid . , pp . 673-83.  
20 
of an election. The amount of money expended by a candidate 
to project this image or information is a crucial factor in 
who will win and who will lose .  Since the incumbent enj oys 
official resources in communicating with constituents , it 
follows that the amount a challenger spends wi l l  be the most 
help ful to him.
42 
The same findings suggest that incumbent security has 
risen by their perquisites , but Ferejohn ' s  object ion to this 
is that there has been no increase in awareness o f  name recall 
and that partisan voters are likely to defect to the incumbent , 
even though they cannot remember his name . But this , too , 
according to Jacobson "loses much of its force . "  He explains , 
" i f  voters consistently prefer incumbents to challengers with-
out recognizing or recalling either one , the phenomenon defies 
rational explanation . . . the hypothesis that incUI'lbents are 
advertis ing themselves better cannot be effectively dismissed. ,
A3 
CONGRESSIONAL ISSUES 
It may be said that parti sanship , incumbency , and 
candidate saliency all contribute to how the electorate will 
cast their votes . But what part of this contribution does 
political issues p lay? According to Stokes and Miller , per­
ceptions about an individual candidate account for most of 
the partisan votes cast against their party and that these 
42 Gary C .  Jaconson, 9-E.· cit . ,  p p .  3 6 - 3 7 . 
43rbid . , p .  2 4 .  
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perceptions hold very little information on how the candi-
date stands on particular i s sues . They concluded from their 
survey that deviations in the vote that do occur from nat ional 
policy are not produced by the party's legis lative record. 
The main themes within the electorate were ' group benefit' 
and ' prosperity-depression' ideas which, in turn , they con­
nected with is sues before Congres s . 44 
Several scholars have presented evidence that voting 
in congressional elections is affected by the Pres ident ' s  per­
formance . Members of the Pres ident's party who approve of the 
j ob he i s  doing are less likely t o  vote for candidates of the 
other party . Tufte ' s  analysi s  of aggregate data indicates that 
the s ize of the losses by the Pres ident ' s  party in midterm elec-
tion depends on his popularity and how the economy i s  faring . 
To be specific, Tufte shows s tatist ically that a "change of 10 
percentage points in the Pres ident's approval rating in the 
Gallup poll is related to a change of 1 . 3  percentage points 
in the national midterm congres s ional vote for the President ' s  
political party ; and a change of $50 . 00 in real disposable 
personal income per capita in the year o f  the election i s  
related to a change o f  1 . 8 percentage points in the vote . 1 45 
44nonald E .  Stokes and Warren E .  Miller , 2£.· cit . , 
pp . 199-2 1 0 .  
45Edward R .  Tufte , "Determinants of the Outcomes of 
Midterm Congressional Elections , "  Amer·ican Poliitca1· Sc"ience 
Review 6 9  ( 1 9 75) : p .  825. 
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Kinder and Kiewiet
46 found that voters who fel t  national 
business conditions had recently worsened were l ikely to 
vote against congressional candidates of the President ' s  
party ; ( this was supported by Ben-Gera Logan , 19 7 7 ;  Fiorina , 
1979). Given the different issue prioritie s  of the two 
parties Sundquist,
47 Okum ,
48 and Hibbs
49 sugge sted that 
voters concerned about unemployment will tend to support 
Democratic candidate s ,  while people concerned with inflation 
will support Republ ican s .  
CONCLUSION 
A maj or thrust of the chapter has been to identify 
crit ical variables other than money which affect the vot e ;  
incumbency s tatus , party identification, candidates and is sues . 
In addition , marginal i ty of House incumbents are examined at 
length . Some of the studies pointed to factors as office per-
quisite s ,  incumbent activity , positive reputations , and infor-
mation as influencing the succe s s  of incumbent s ,  while others 
46Donald R. Kinder and Roderick D. Kiewiet ,  "Economic 
Discontent and Political Behavior : The Role of Personal 
Grievances and Collective Economic Judgements in Congress ional 
Voting , "  American Journal o·f ·Polit ica'l -sc·ience 2 3  ( 1 9 7 9): pp . 495-51 7 .  
47 James L .  Sundquis t ,  Politics and Policy:·· ·The ·Eisen­
hower , Kenned and Johnson Years (Washington , D. C.: The 
Broo ings Institute , , p .  
48 Arthur M .  Okun , " Comments on Stigler ' s  Paper , "  
American Economic Review 63 ( 1 9 7 3): pp . 1 7 2- 7 7 .  
49Douglas A. Hibb , "Political Parties and MacroeconotTtic 
Policy,"- Ameri'can ·po·litical Scienc·e Review 7 1  ( 1 9 7 7): pp. 146 7 -8 7 . 
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pointed t o  'incumbency '  and ' part y '  for supplying easy voting 
cues to electorate in low information elections . The incum-
bents are said to enj oy credit claiming for federal projects 
in their districts and to provide popular and noncontroversial 
constituency service . But ' information' has been defined in 
the literature as having the most decisive effect on how the 
electorate will vote .  The more information produced by the 
candidates the more costly the campaign will be . As Jacobson.. 
remarks , "other things being equal , the more a challenger 
spends , the better he will do at the polls . "SO This leads to 
the next chapter which will attempt to answer the question, 
how important i s  money and how i s  it raised? 
SOGary C. Jacobson , 2.E· c·it., p .  31. 
CHAPTER I I  
HOW IMPORTANT I S  MO�t:Y 
The primary factors contributing to the importan ce of 
money in congres s ional elections have been the decline of 
p arty organizations and of party line voting. Traditionally , 
the party organizations controlled the most important parts 
of the electorial process ,  that is , candidate selection , issue 
5 1  positions , s trategies , and campaign resource s .  
S ince the arrival of  direct primaries , party organiza­
tions have lost control of the candidate selection proces s .  
Prior to direct primaries , the party organization controlled 
candidate selection , slate making , caucuses , and conventions ; 
now these are the responsibility of the voters .  The advent of  
mass media , and the ability of candidates to gather their ovm 
personal resources through the use o f  polls have demons trated 
their s trength to circumvent the door-to-door activity of the 
. . 5 2  pa rty organizations . 
As seen in Chapter I ,  Table 2 ,  s trong partisan rela-
tionships have dropped. As political party organizations 
become less important in mobilizing voters and the number of  
voters not marking :straight party tickets increases , the 
5 1Robert Agranoff , The New Style in Ele·c tion Campaigns 
(Boston : Holbrook Press , Inc . , 1976): p .  11. 
52 rbid . , p .  1 9 .  
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candidates have turned to people with the ability to market 
them through other types of media . Firs t came advertising 
25 
men to produce messages for radio , televis ion , and newspaper 
audiences . Then came pollsters , who used market research 
and academic voting behavior to target different groups with 
specific i s sues r ela tive to each . Fi nall y ,  more specialized 
personnel were employed for direct mail , j ournalists to formu-
late news release s ,  TV producers to enhance desired images , 
computer prograrrnners and voting hehavior researchers to target 
. f. b . 53 speci ic voters y precinct. 
Determination of how much money is needed to run an 
effective campaign varies and information concerning this i s  
scarce .  It has become easier to obtain access to campaign 
finance information because of the 1976  Federal Election 
Reform Act , but there are s ti l l  many road blocks , such a s  
es timates o f  direct mail spending , media production, etc., 
which are not limited under the act.  The budget estimates 
that follow in Table 6 represent, in round figure s ,  realistic 
expenditures in 1 9 7 0  for a $100 , 000  congress ional campaign. 54 
Since campaign spending is critical to support a 
viable campaign, we must ask "what determines how much money 
congressional candidates raise and spend?1155 The importance 
5 3rbid . , p .  2 4 .  
54rbid. , p .  3 5 .  
55Gary C .  Jacobson, �· ·cit. , p .  5 1 . 
TABLE 6 
Expenditures in 1970 for a $100 , 000 Consress ional Campaign 
Headquarters 
Personnel 
Candidate and Staff Travel Expenses 
Special Events 
Research (Polling and Election Data) 
Direct Mail 
Televis ion 
Radio 
Newspaper 
Outdoor Advertising and Transit 
Agency Fee 
Literature and Stickers 
Telephone Banks 
Congressional 
$ 10, 000 
1 5 , 000 
1 , 500 
500 
1 4 , 500  
1 1 , 000 
3 0 , 500 
3 , 000 
2 , 500 
5 , 000 
4 , 000 
2 , 500 
$100 , 000 
Source :  Robert Agranoff, The New Style in Election Ca�­
paigns ; 1976 , Holbrook Pres s ,  Inc . , Boston , p .  36. 
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of the question is relevan t ,  because if spending alters elec-
t ion outcomes , the contributors have an important role in 
determining who will win . If the relationship between spending 
and votes is reciprocal , this can only be determined by exam­
ining the behavior of  the contributors and candidates that seek 
their suppor t .  The rest of  this chapter will b e  devoted t o  an 
analysis of  campaign financing from the perspective of  the 
. b  56 contri utor . 
56rbid . , p .  5 1 .  
As can be seen in Table 7 , House incumbents spend 
more than their challengers . The odds are in strong favor 
27  
o f  the high spending incumbent to win. In 1978 the incumbent 
won in 312 of 320 cases where he spent more than the challenger. 
But when the challenger spends more than the incumbent , he 
improves his chances . Eleven of the 19 challengers won over 
incumbents ;  7 of the 11  outspent their opponent by more than 
$10 0 , 000 . 
TABLE 7 
Spending by 1978 House Winners 
The chart surranarizes the spending patterns of winners 
of 1978 House contes t s .  The bulk of the winners were incum­
bents who outspent their challengers .  In open seat s ,  the 
winners tended to be the big spenders .  But succes s ful chal­
lengers were not necessarily the big spenders . 
Incumbents Challengers· OE en Seats Total 
Spent More 312 1 1  43 366 
Spent Les s  46 8 15 69 
Total 358 1 9  58 435 
Source : Congress ional Quarterly , Inc . ,  Sept . 29 , 197 9 ,  p .  2152 
By analyzing the trend over this period, it i s  seen 
that election costs escalated each year . In 197 8 ,  $92 . 2  
million was spent by candidates on the November ballot ; this 
represents a 44 percent increase over the 1976 cos t s .  Likewis e ,  
the problems o f  raising funds are different for incumbents ,  
challengers and candidates for open seat s . 57  
5 7Federal Election Conuni s sion ,  "Candidates • Campaign 
Cos t s  for Congressional Contests Have Gone Up at a Fast Pace , "  
Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report 37 ( 1979) : p .  2156 .  
IlIDIVIDUAL CONTRIBUTORS 
House candidates rely on the small contributor as 
well as on party and non-party coimnittees for the bulk of  
their war che s t .  Republicans place a greater reliance on 
small contributors and party committees . The Democrats 
rely more on non-party sources , such as labor , loans , and 
28 
contributions by candidates to their own campaign. But both 
equally receive large contributions of more than $100 . 58 
By observation we can as sess how much was given to 
candidates , but to further analyze this process we must ask,  
what are the individual ' s  motives for contributing to one 
candidate or the other? Huch could be said about this topic 
and it is beyond the scope of this thesis to go into this 
area in any great depth, although I will sunnnarize particular 
main points that have surfaced in the literatur e .  
"Each individual voter i s  a special interes t ,  with 
self-set economic and social ideals and priorities . 1159  Such 
is the broad nature of individual motives , A profit motive 
theory tries to explain gifts made in politics , but reality 
is somewhat more complex than this . "Every person on the 
contemporary economic scene - - the owner manager , the corpora-
tion executive , the farmer , the worker , the union officer , the 
consUI!ler and the saver emerges as an extremely complex figure 
58 
. 
Ibid . , p .  156 .  
59statement filed with the Connnittee on House Admini­
stration and made part of the record of the hearings on H . R .  1 
and related legislation, Congressional Digest (1979) : p .  2 9 9 .  
whose attitudes , motives , and behavior vary--from period to 
period and from individual to individual . 116° Comparable 
diversity characterizes the many facets of political giving 
and such is the complexity of the individual .  
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A l imited s tudy by Les ter W.  Milbrath , 6 1  done through 
intens i ve interviews with four samples of North Carolinians 
who contributed during the 1952 presidential election, classi­
fied each respondent according to dominant and subsidary goals 
which influenced contribution. S ix broad categories of goals 
were constructed on the basis of the interview. Table 8 pre-
sents his findings .  
The causes for giving are many. The focus will be on 
the predispositional characteris tics that are related to giving ; 
I will summarize them for the purpose of this thesis . 
a) Intens ity of competition ; party 
rivalry , or party competition . 
b )  The issues and personalities of 
a campaign .  
c )  The level of economic prosperity 
in a community .  
d) Specific s takes individuals have 
in governMental action. 
e) Habitual contr ibutors ;  a durable 
core of supporters from each party . 
f) The desire for s ta tus . 
6 0Albert Lauterbach, Mari , Motives , and 
logical Frontiers of Economics I t  aca : Corne 
Pre s s ,  1954) ,  p .  238. 
Mone : 
University 
61Lester W .  Milbrath ,  "Motives and Characteristics of 
Political Contributors :  North Carolina General Election 1952 , '' 
in Alexander Heard, The Costs of Democrac� (Chapel Hil l ,  N . C . : 
The University of North Carolina Pres s ,  1 60) , p .  7 1 .  
TABLE 8 
Distribution of Respondents by Dominant "Goals" of 
Their Gift s :  Four Samples of North Carolina 
Contributions , General Election , 1952  
Contributors Who Gave to 
Specified Committees 
$100 or More Les s  than $1 00 
Goal Dem. Rep . Dem. Rep . 
Government Policy 1 3  1 8  3 13 
Personal Identification 3 3 18 12 
Duty and Responsibility 0 0 1 0 
Government Privilege 4 0 3 0 
Private Privilege 0 2 0 0 
Entree 5 0 0 0 
Total Samples 25 2 3  25 25 
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Source : Lester W. Milbrath , "Motivations and Characteristics 
of Political Contributors :  North Carolina General 
Election 1952" (Ph . D .  Dissertation , University of 
North CArolina) in The Cost s  of Democrac�, by Alex­
ander Heard, 1960 , North Carolina Print hop ,. Raliegh . 
g) A drive to conform; you do not want 
to be the only heel among your peers 
that does not give . 
h) Exchange for political influence . 
i) For acce s s .  
j )  Personal recognition and attention 
from the candidate . 
k) Individuals derive current satis ­
faction intrinsic to the act of 
participation (consumption motive) . 
1 )  They derive expected returns , such as 
financial rewards or a desired set of 
public goods (investment motive) . 6 2 
Whatever the motivation , two fac t s  are clear . In the long 
run, those who contribute will win access to the candidate 
N .  C .  : 
62 Alexander Heard, The Cos t s  of Democrac� (Chapel Hill , 
The University of North Carolina Pre s s , 1 60) , pp . 69- 94.  
for their points of view. Since some people give and some 
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do not and some give more than others , different leve ls of 
access are achieved. Second , the office holder and his staff 
feel some form of commitment to those that contribute. 6 3  
The foregoing discussion has examined the reasons why 
people contr ibu te, but a better understanding of this area 
can be advanced i f  we know who contributes . In Table 9 we 
see that contributions are skewed towards high income and 
professional, managerial and business person s .  Rates also 
increase among the middle-aged. "Of the $62 . 3  million in 
contributions to congressional candidates in 1972 , 35 percent 
was from 41 , 600 people who gave $100 or more ; over half gave 
$500 or more and 26  percent ( $16 . 5  million) came from contri­
butions of  less than $100 . 1 164 
According to the Federal Election Commi s sion ,  House 
candidates raised $65 . 7  million in small contributions in 197 6 ,  
of which 36 percent of all funds came from individual contri­
butions of less than $10 0 ;  2 2 .  6 per'cent or $14. 8 million came 
from contributions over $100 (Table 10) . Likewis e ,  a 1978 FEC 
study found that 67 . 5  percent came from individual contribu­
tions , but it must be noted that candidates ' contribution to 
their own campaigns and contributions under $100 were not cited 
63oavid W. Adamany , Financing National Politics in the 
New Stlle in Election Campaigns (Boston , Mass . :  Holbrook Press 
Inc . , 976) , p .  230. 
64rbid . ,  p .  2 3 1 .  
TABLE 9 
Campaign Contribution Rates by Income Level , 
Age , and Occupation, 1952-1972 
Annual Family Income 
less than $3000 
$3000-$4999 
$5000-$7499* 
$7500-$9999* 
$10 , 000 and over 
Age 
18-20 
21-24 
25-34 
35-44 
45 -54 
55-64 
65  and over 
Occupational Group 
Professional 
Business & Managerial 
White Collar 
Skilled 
Unskilled 
Farm Operator 
Retired 
Housewife 
Election Year 
1952 1956 1960 1964 1968 1972 
2% 
3 
7 
14 
1 7  
4 
3 
5 
4 
6 
4 
18% 
14 
6 
3 
1 
1 
3 
2 
2% 3% 
6 8 
12 9 
17  2 0  
3 1  30 
6 
7 
13  
12 
11  
6 
19% 
18 
7 
8 
7 
6 
6 
6 
7 
12 
1 1  
1 3  
1 4  
9 
22% 
15 
8 
13  
10  
2 
12 
16 
2 .. , '" 
6 
7 
15 
2 1  
5 
10 
14 
9 
10  
7 
25�� 
20 
12 
6 
5 
9 
6 
8 
3"/ .o 
3 
7 
8 
12 
4 
7 
8 
7 
10 
8 
2% 
3 
6 
6 
14 
3% 
9 
8 
13 
9 
9 
5 
11% 20% 
7 15 
7 8 
10 6 
8 5 
11  2 
8 5 
7 7 
*For 1968 and 1972 these two categories are respectively :  
$5000-$7999 and $8000- $9999 . 
Source : David W .  Adamany ,  Financ ing National Politics in 
the New Style in Election Campaigns ,  in Robert 
Argranoff, 1976, Holbrook Press , Inc . , Boston. 
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TABLE 10  
Source of  Receipts for Congressional Candidates 
HOUSE 
Millions of Dollars 
100 
90 
80 
70  
60 
so 
40 
30 
20 
10 
0 
$92 201 7 2 1  
Other 4 5 . 9% 
Individuals 10 . 1 %  101-499 
Individuals 1 2 . 4 %  
$500 & more 
Party 6 .  8% 
Non-Party 2 4 . 8% PAC ' s  
$6 5 , 740 , 9 37 
-Other 1 . 4% 
ndidate 9 .  8% 
Individuals 36.0% 
$100 & less 
Individuals 1 1 . 5% 
Non-Party 
PAC ' s  2 2 . 4% 
+----''--��������---����--'���������Loo-����-
1978 1976  
Source : Federal Election ColllI11ission , 1 9 7 6  and 1978 Reports 
on U . S .  Senate and House Caropaigns Financial Activity. 
by the 1978 FEC study, nor are loans from the candidate or 
other sources . The basic sources of ca�paign �oney in order 
of importance are : individuals , interest and ideological 
group s ,  political parties and candidates themselves . 65  
Generally contributions are disproportionately given 
to attractive and experience candidates ,  to competitors in a 
highly emotional or polarized election , or to candidates that 
65Federal Election Corraniss ion, 2E· cit . , p .  2 1 5 3 .  
have sharp ideological difference s .  Both candidates are 
supported if the race looks close , but much of the money 
goes to contests for open seats or where the district has 
been marginally changed .  I t  i s  these elections that tend 
to be more competitive and attract better candidates when 
h . . . 66  sue s i tuations aris e .  
ELECTORAL COMPETITION AND CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS 
One factor related to patterns of spending is the 
67 68 intensity of electoral competition . Ransome , Sorauf , 
34 
Leutholds , 6 9  and Adamany70 have all commented that the inten-
sity of feelings and the closene s s  of party competition affect 
the levels of spending in election s .  In his 1962-1964 Wis-
consin study on competitiveness in state house races , Adamany 
found that ' 'spending rises rapidly in electorally competitive 
circumstances (where the winning candidate receives l e s s  than 
55 percent of the vote) and that a sense of urgency about 
electoral outcomes created by closely contested elections 
66  Gary C .  Jacobson , �· cit . ,  p .  7 2 .  
6 7 Coleman Ransome , Jr . , The Office ·of Governor in the 
U . S .  (Tuscaloosa : Univers i ty of Alabama Press , 1956) .  
68Frank J .  Sorauf , Party Politics in America (Boston : 
Little, Brown and Company , 2nd ed. , 1972) ,  pp . 309-328 .  
69oavid Leuthold , Electioneerin in Democrac 
pai,ns for Congress (New Yor : o n ri ey an 
p .  5. 
7 0oavid Adamany , Financing Politics (Madison :  Univer­
s ity of Wisconsin Pre s s r 1969) ,  pp . 74-86. 
undoubtedly increases both the number and the size of fin-
. 1 . b  . 7 1  ancia contri utions . 
35 
·Jacobson also found in a s tudy of electoral competi­
tion and individual campaign contributions to House candi­
dates from 1972-1976 , that the "closer the prior contes t ,  
the more the candidate received in individual donations . 
The effect is especially pronounced for challengers .  Both 
quid pro quo and consumption contributions to c�allengers 
should increase with the expected levels of competition . 
Incumbents on the other hand, can raise quid pro quo and 
to some extent consumption contributions independently of 
how close the election is expected to be . "7 2  He also found 
that regardle s s  of how close the last  election was for open 
seats , it  attracts large sums from individuals . Table 11  
indicates just tha t .  
POLITICAL ACTION COMMITTEES (PAC) CONTRIBUTIONS 
The Federal Election Commis sion has reported PAC con­
tributions to federal candidates for the 1980 elections to be 
$60 . 4  million (Jan. 1 ,  1979 - Dec .  3 1 ,  1980) . That figure was 
nearly five times as great as the ,�12 . 5  mill�on in PAC contri­
butions in 1974 and 1 . 5  times greater than the $35 . 1  million 
level of 1 9 7 8 . 7 3  
7 1Ibid . , pp . 74-86 . 
7 2  Gary C .  Jacobson , �· cit . ,  p .  7 3 .  
7 3Larry Light , "The Game of PAC Targeting : 
Foes and Guesswork, "  Con�ression·a1 qua·rter1y Weekly 
�9 (Nov. 2 1 ,  1981) : pp . 267-2270. 
Friends , 
Report 
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TABLE 1 1  
Electoral Competition and Individual Campaign Contributions to 
House Candidates ,  1972-76,  by Party and Incumbency Status 
1972 
Incunbents 
Democrats 
Republicans 
Challengers 
Democrats 
Republicans 
1974 
Incumbents 
Democrats 
Republicans 
Challengers 
Democrats 
Republicans 
1976 
Incumbents 
Democrats 
Republicans 
Challengers 
Democrats 
Repub licans 
Candidates 
Party 
1972 
Democrats 
Republicans 
1974 
Democrats 
Republicans 
1976 
Democrats 
Republicans 
Winner ' s  Share of Adjusted AWo-Party Vote in 
Last Election 
60. 1% 
or more 5 5 . 1 - 60 . 0% 
551. Percent 
or less Change 
$24,750 (109) c $29, 535 (20) $44,600 (26) +80 . 2  
3 0 , 495 (69) 43, 900 ( 38) 4 6 , 156 (34) +5 1 . 4  
9 .  119 (79) 
16 , 358 ( 1 1 2 )  
3 6 , 603 ( 102) 
61 , 55 6  (98) 
2 9 , 634 (107) 
8 .  995 (108) 
4 3 .  798 (138) 
64 , 366 (48) 
14 , 9 14 (48) 
15 , 227 (138) 
2 2 , 5 2 1  (38) 3 6 , 054 (24) +295 . 4  
2 2 , 129 (21) 3 7 , 136 (22) +127 . 0  
4 7 , 382 (2fl) 49,413 (30) +35 . 0  
7 7 , 750 (23) 8 7 , 294 (41) +41 . 8  
48.467 (24) 68 , 29 3  (31) + 1 3 0 . 5  
24 , 28 7  (26) 2 6 , 7 2 1  (26) +19 7 . 1  
6 6 , 838 (30) 7 5 , 072 (40) +71 . 4  
7 0 , 5 7 2  (31) 80 , 043 (42) +24 . 4  
2 0 , 5 73 (31) 2 9 , 660 (42) +98.9 
5 2 , 797 (30) 7 2 , 194 (40) +374 . 1  
Open Seats 
Won 
$ 6 7 , 225 
(12) 
58 , 45 3  
( 15) 
7 2 .  785 
( 1 7 )  
6 6 , 5 37 
( 14) 
6 1 , 786 
(28) 
5 3 , 5 31 
(5) 
Lost 
$49 , 23 1  
(16) 
38 , 115 
(13) 
5 7 , 247 
(14) 
36 , 020 
(20) 
8 3 , 206 
(5)  
4 3 , 029 
(28) 
Won 
$41 , 000 
(10) 
6 8 , 288 
(8) 
164,870 
( 5 )  
6 1 , 901 
(6) 
7 8 , 95 1  
(4) 
75 , 419 
(6) 
Lost 
$36 , 300 
( 7) 
6 2 , 200 
(1) 
47 , 6 90 
( 6) 
72, 337 
(6) 
6 0 , 596 
(6) 
61 , 9 7 0  
(4) 
$ 7 0 , 312 +42 . 8  
( 1 7 )  
7 6 , 413 +100 . 4  
(16) 
6 9 , 218 + 1 . 3  
(10) 
6 4 , 935 +80 . 2  
( 6) 
6 1 , 584 -26 . 0  
( 7 )  
9 8 , 695 +129 . 4  
( 7 )  
:lote : Includes candidates with major party opposition only. 
aThe figures have been acjusted for recistrictin� where necessary; 
cases for which this information was not available (twentv in 
1972,  two in 1974) were omitted. 
bPercentage change from least to most competitive category. For 
open seats, least competitive category was designated as that 
in which the party ' s  candidate in the last election won less 
than 40 percent of the vote. 
cNumber of cases from which percentages were computed; the 
numbers do not match symMetrically for 1972 and 1974 because 
of adjus tments to changes in �istrict boundaries. 
Source : Gary C .  Jacobson , Money in Congress ional Elections. 
3 7  
Spurred by the 1 9 7 4  campaign finance law that limited 
individual contributions , PAC ' s  have tripled between 1974 to 
1 9 7 9 .  In 1 9 7 8 ,  1938 PAC ' s  registered ; for 1980 there were 
2779 PAC ' s  in operation, not counting political party affi­
liates . In 1980 , congressional candidates received $55 . 2  
million from non-party PAC ' s ,  up more than a third from the 
$35 . 1  million in 1 9 7 8 .  The FEC has divided the PAC ' s  into 
s ix categories which account for 90 percent of the $60 . 4  
million of all PAC contributions ; they are Trade , Membership 
and Health, Labor and Corporate ( see Table 12) . 7 4  
The majority of  PAC money- -nearly $37 . 1  million- -went 
to incumbents , with the remainder divided between the challenger 
and candidates for open seats ( $2 3 . 3  million) . As can be seen ,  
there is a strong pro-incumbent b ias ; but because of  a heavily 
Democratic tilt among labor committees , the Democrats enjoy a 
$36 . 6  million lead over Republicans in their fight for the PAC 
funds . While the Democrats do have an edge over the Republi­
cans , the Republicans have closed this margin of disparity 
with corporat e ,  trade and health organizations along with ' party 
contributions ' over $10 , 00 0 . 75 
The Democrats hold the lead in PAC funds because most 
are incumbents and as the maj ority party they hold leadership 
places and senior committee positions that do the most  good 
74Ibid . , p .  2268.  
75Ibid . , p .  226 9 .  
TABLE 12 
1979-80 PAC Contributions to Federal Candidates 
( in millions of dollars) 
38 
Total Party Candidate Status 
Contri- Affiliation In cum- Chai-
but ions De ms Rep s  bent lenger Open 
Corporation $21 . 7  $ 7 . 8  $13 . 9  $1 2 . 5  $ 6 . 9  $2 . 4  
Labor 14 . 2  13 . 2  0 . 9  10 . 1  2 . 5  1 . 6  
Unconnected 
Organizations 5 . 1  1 . 6  3 . 4  1 . 6  2 . 5  0 . 9  
Trade , Membership , 
Health 17 . 2  7 . 6  9 . 6  1 1 . 2  4 . 0  2 . 1  
Cooperatives 1 .  5 0 . 9  0 . 5  1 . 2  0 . 1  0 . 2  
Corporations 
without Stock 0 . 7  0 . 4  0 . 3  0 . 5  0 . 1  0 . 1  
Total $60 . 4  $31 . 6  $28 . 8  $37 . 1  $16 . 1  $ 7 . ?.  
Note :  Figures under "Party Affiliation" and "Candidate Status" 
do not always equal the total contribution due to 
rounding . 
Source : FEC in Congressional �uarterly , Inc . , Nov. 2 1 ,  1981 , 
p .  2268 . 
for the interest group s .  While looking at trends , the Republi-
cans are catching up due to heavier contributions to GOP chal-
lengers by corporate and trade associations . In 1 9 7 7 - 78 the 
GOP received 43 . 9  percent , although Democrats lead Republicans 
$129 . 3  million to $122 million, respective l y .  Accordingly 
there are no set standards for giving PAC money. The reasons 
are as diverse as the PAC ' s  themselve s ,  but much depends on 
the candidate ' s  ideology , his s tanding in Congres s ,  and internal 
PAC politic s .  Mos t  PAC ' s  say their primary j ob is to punish 
their enemies and re-v:ard their friends . Recently PAC' s are 
trying to make some members more accountable by investing in 
the challenger in races they know they will los e . 7 6  
76Ibid . , p .  2 2 7 0 .  
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The business PAC ' s  use several standards in making 
their contribution s .  Ralph W .  Kittle, Chairman of  the Inter-
national Paper Co . ,  political action conunittee said that,  his 
group "contributes on an incumbent' s voting record and on the 
I 
' general qualities ' of a non- incumbent. 11 7 7  The auto dealers 
look at how helpful they are in their committee s ; "We ' re 
looking especially for members who serve on key committees , 
and people who help is on the floor . 1 1 78  According to the 
Congressional quarterly , business was not reluctant to contri-
bute the maximum of  $10 , 000 to Republican challengers who were 
facing liberal Democrats . 
Labor , on the other hand , has consi s tently stayed with 
the Democrats . Contributions made by the two bigge s t  union 
PAC ' s  Connnittee on Political Education ( COPE) sponsored by the 
AFL-CIO and the United Auto Workers ,  consisted of  $83 3 , 200 to 
Congressional candidates in 1977-7 8 ;  all but $27 , 600 went to 
Democrats . The maj ority of this  money went to moderate to 
liberal candidates from northern s tates , Democrats who sup­
ported key labor issues . 79 
IDEOLOGICAL COMMITTEES 
In the past couple of years we have seen an emergence 
of  several ideological PAC ' s  on both the Right and Left. The 
7 7congressional '{uarterly , Inc . , "PAC : M.ajor New 
Lobbying Weapon , "  Elections ' 80 (Washington, D .  C . : Congres­
sional Quarterl y ,  Inc . ,  1980) :  p .  142 . 
7 S Ibid . , p . 14 2 . 
7 9Ibid . , p .  143 . 
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' New Righ t '  under the names of Nat i onal Conservative Poli-
tical Action Committee (NAPAC) , Moral ��j ority , The Congres-
sional Club , Citizens for the Repub l i c ,  Fund for a Conserva­
tive Maj ority , Committee for the Survival of a Free Congres s ,  
and Americans for Change are s ome o f  the leaders among inde-
pendent sources of ideological money .  These groups clearly 
emphas iz e  negative advertising campaigns to defeat liberal 
Democra t s .  Having a financial and technical advantage , the 
conservatives have raised $6 , 156 , 9 7 4 ,  through the help of 
Richard A .  Viguer i e ' s direct mail solicitations . However , 
a new generation of liberal political action committees are 
s truggling to raise money in light of the advances of the 
Right . Under the names of National Committee for an Effec­
tive Congress (NCEC) , Independent Ac tion Fund for a Democratic 
Maj ority , the Committee for the Future of Amer ica , and Pro-
gressive Po litical Action Committee (PROPAC) had receipts of 
$1 , 647 , 680 from January 1981 to June 30 , 1981 . They , too , use 
direct mail solicitations , and are targeting certain conserva-
tive Republ icans us ing the same tactics as the conservative 
PAC ' s ,  Lhat i s ,  ' negative independent spending ' .  Plans in 
1982 are to give each of its favored Democratic candidates the 
legal maximum of $5000 for the primary and $5000 for the gen­
eral election. Table 13 gives the breakdown of money raised 
80 by both group s .  
80Larry Ligh t ,  "New Liberal Money Groups Compete for 
Campaign Funds , "  Congress·ional �uarterly Weekly Report 39 
(October 3 ,  1981) : pp . 1905-190 . 
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TABLE 13 
Receipts and Expenditures to Congressional Candidates 
from Conservative and Liberal Political Action Committees 
1981 1981 
Receipts Expenditures 
Conservative Groups 
Congress ional Club 
National Conservat ive PAC 
Fund for a Conservative 
Majority 
Citizens for the Republic 
Commi ttee for the ' :Survival 
of a Free Congress 
Americans for Change 
Liberal Groups 
National Committee for 
an Effective Congress 
Fund for a Democratic 
Majority 
Independent Action 
Committee for the Future 
of America 
Democrats for the 80 ' s  
Progre s s ive PAC 
$5 , 3 2 3 , 5 6 6  $5 , 809 , 007 
4 , 14 3 , 132 4 , 2 2 4 , 109 
1 , 06 0 , 7 2 7  1 , 063 , 8 7 8  
1 , 049 , 680 9 2 7 , 83 9  
889 , 207 912 , 82 7  
336 , 863 330 , 106 
$9 7 2 , 863 $ 1 , 029 , 430 
861 , 09 1  6 3 6 , 196 
684 , 282 673 , 100 
6 7 8 , 469 399 , 2 19 
600 , 108 287 , 249 
205 , 03 3  165 , 765 
Source : Congres sional Quarterly , Inc . , Feb . 2 7 , 1982 , p .  482 . 
POLITICAL PARTIES 
"Congress ional candidates normally find that political 
parties are of surpris ingly lit tle help in their efforts to get 
elected . Not only are the parties organizationally feeble in 
most congress ional districts , but they provide little in the 
f f . . 1 . h . . .. 8 1  way o inancia assis tance to t eir nominee s .  Fishell 
reports that "even in those counties where candidate recruit-
ment is tightly controlled by organizations which approximate 
81 Gary C .  Jacobson , �· c it . , p .  8 9 .  
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the stereotype ' machine ' ,  candidates are norma lly expected to 
develop much of their own resource base . 11 82 He quotes one 
challenger as saying, " I f  I hadn ' t  been able to guarantee that 
I could gain financial backing , I would have been passed over . "  
Democratic candidates receive far less financial support from 
party organizations than their Repub lican opponent s .  The 
reason the Republicans have this advantage i s  that those who 
identify with the party are in the upper socioeconomic rank s .  
Not only are they able to help financially , but there is a 
high correlation between the upper socioeconomic c lass s tanding 
and a willingne s s  to contribute . Identification tends to run 
towards the party rather than to the candidate.  The results 
are that the Republ icans are able to centralize their resources , 
through fund raisers and contributors that identify with the 
party itself and disburse the funds according to prioritie s . 8 3  
For Democrat s ,  the resources are scattered . Incumbency 
i s  the foremo s t  fund raising resource that must be shared with 
party organizations in exchange for party commi tments·_to help 
their campaigp . The party ' s  main ally is labor , but labor 
generally is at arms length with the party , contributing to 
individual candidates personally. The party itself does not 
attract ide.ological supporters who are capable of large fin-
ancial contributions , nor can it easily SUIIllllon a corps of men 
82Jeff 
Challengers_:_ in· 
Con ,res·sional 
DR.VJ.. McKay 
Company , Inc . , 
8 3David W .  Adamany , Campai�n Finance in 
Scituat e ,  Mas s . : Duxburg Pres s ,  1 72) , p .  160. 
Amer ica (North 
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who have the personal resources to be effective fund raisers . 
As can be seen in Table 14,  Republ icans receive more money 
from their party sources than Democrat s ,  but neither receive 
more than 20 percent of the gross receipts in any year or 
84 category. 
The national committee s , rather than the countie s ,  fin-
ance the bulk of congressional elections . According to the 
Congress ional Quarterly , by the end of September, 1980 , the 
Democratic Congress ional Campaign Connnittee had spent $3 3 3 , 244 
towards a projected $7 5 0 , 000 by November . The Republicans , by 
contrast , expended $ 1 , 9 82 , 150 with projected figures at $3 
million by November . The average expenditure by the Republi­
cans was $5 , 25 5 , compared to the Democrats $2 , 442 per candidate . 
The Republicans focus on what they believe are vulnerable Demo-
cratically held seat s ,  while exper imenting with giving pr imary 
financing to contenders deemed good general election mater ial 
by the National Republican Congress ional Committe e .  The Demo­
crats ' strategy i s  defens ive , while trying to pick up margina l . 
Republ �can held seat s .  The Denocrats do not give money to 
pr imary candidates , althoueh in the Noverrlber election the DNC 
gives money accord�ng to "marg�nality of (an incumbent) Repub­
lican or financ ial need . 1185 Both the Republicans and Demo­
crats give proportionately the same percentages ; 60 percent 
went f0r incumbents with the rest divided between open seat 
84rbid . , p .  161 . 
85Larry Lip,h t ,  "Republican Groups Dominate in Party 
Campaign Spending , ' Co'nfress ional quart·erly Weekly Report 38 
(�ov . 1 ,  1980) , pp . 323 -3236. 
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TABLE 14 
Average Party Contributions to House Candidates 1972-1976 
1972 
Incumbents 
Democrats 
Repub licans 
Challengers 
Democrats 
Repub l icans 
Open Seats 
Democrats 
Repub l icans 
All Candidates 
Democrats 
Repub licans 
1974 
Incumbents 
Democrats 
Repub licans 
Challengers 
Democrats 
Republi cans 
Open Seats 
Democrats 
Repub licans 
All Candidates 
Democrats 
Republicans 
1976 
Incumbents 
Democrats 
Republicans 
Challengers 
Democrats · 
Republicans 
Open Seats 
Democrats 
Repub licans 
All Candidates 
Democrats 
Republicans 
Party 
Contributions 
$ 4 , 5 8 1  
7 , 9 3 3  
1 , 8 3 3  
6 , 130 
4 , 0 64 
1 2 , 003 
1 , 0 7 6  
4 , 5 6 5  
5 8 8  
1 , 6 3 6  
1 , 2 7 7  
9 , 8 90 
3 , 952 
8 , 8 9 7  
3 , 05 3  
8 , 45 9  
4 , 109 
14 , 32 0  
a Percent 
8 . 2  
13 . 0  
6 . 1  
19 . 5  
4 . 2  
13 . 5  
6 . 7  
16 . 1  
1 . 9  
5 . 2  
1 . 0  
8 . 0  
1 . 2  
12 . 3  
1 . 4  
7 . 4  
4 . 5  
8 . 4  
6 . 7  
15 . 3 
2 . 9  
14 . 0  
5 . 0  
12 . 9  
Note : Includes candidates with maj or party opposition only . 
aPercentage of a l l  contributions . 
Source : Gary C .  Jacobson, Money in Congressional Elect ions , 
pp . 7 8 - 7 9 .  
seekers and challengers .  Table 15 gives the breakdown 
according to party. 
McKeough also found that both parties contributed 
more frequently , and in larger sums , to safe incumbent s  
86 than hopeless challengers . Marginal incumbents received 
money more freqvently , and in larger amounts , than marginal 
challengers .  He also found that parties give significantly 
more when competition is tight. 
INDIVIDUAL SPENDING BY CANDIDATES 
45 
A final source of campaign funds i s  from the candidate 
himself.  Statist ically , non- incumbents contribute more to 
their campaign than incumbents , and when the district becomes 
more marginal or where there is an open seat , the challengers 
are generally more willing to spend their own money. Pro­
portionately , in the least marginal races receipts from the 
challengers are the greatest because of their inabi lity to 
attract funds from contributors .
87 
CONCLUSION 
Both Democrats and Republicans receive a large amount 
of their war chest from individual contribut ions . The sources 
for these funds ,  however , differ for each of the two partie s .  
86Kevin L .  McKeough , Financing Campaigns for Congress : 
Contribution Pat terns of National Level Part and 
Commi ttees Princeton , N .  J. : Citizens 
1970) ,  p .  46 , 
8 7  Gary C .  Jacobson , � ·  cit . , p .  9 7 .  
RF.PUBLICANS 
National 
Republican 
Senatorial 
Cornnittee 
National 
Republican 
Congre s sional 
Commi ttee 
Republican 
National 
Committee 
DEMOCRATS 
Democratic 
Senatorial 
Campaign 
Cor.unittee 
Democratic 
Congress ional 
Carnpair;n 
Commi ttee 
Democratic 
National 
Commi ttee 
(Democratic 
Services Corp . )  
1Figures based 
Receipts 
TABLE 15 
Election Sp ending by Political Parties 
(Jan. 1 ,  19 7 9 ,  through Sept . 3 0 ,  1980) 
Amount 
Spent On 
Federal 
Candidates 
Amount 
Spent On 
Federal 
Candidates 
1 9 7 7 - 7 8  Open 
Chall­
engers 
$ 10 , 444 , 980 $ 3 , 2 7 5 , 88 7  3 , 055 , 400 3 3 . 2% 5 9 . 8% 
1 1 , 95 2 , 9 00 1 , 9 81 , 150 2 , 6 n6 , 845 2 0 . 3 18 . 8  
3 4 , 0 1 3 , 804 5 8 1 , 792 1 , 242 , 225 32 . 2  54 . 5  
438 , 958 363 , 000 42 7 , 000 1 1 . 0  14 . 2  
1 , 383 , 2 11 334, 244 5 3 7  , 438 2 1 . 2  1 8 . 9  
6 , 0 15 , 352 3 74 , 1 74 133 , 129 2 2 . 3  2 0 . 9 
Average 
Amount 
Incum- Number of Spent Per 
bents Candidates Candidate 
7 . 0% 35 $93 , 5 96 
60 . 9  261 1 5 , 255 
1 3 . 3  9 7  5 , 9 9 8  
74 . 8  2 6  $ 1 3 , 9 6 1  
5 9 . 9  138 2 , 442 
5 6 . 8  56 6 , 6 82 
on reports filed through Aug . 30 ; report for Sep t .  1980 was incomplete 
Source : FEC in Congress ional Quarterly, Inc . , Nov. 1 ,  1980 , p .  3238.  
� 
0\ 
The Democrats emphas ize patronage , program and ideology, 
especially in winning labor endorsements . Democrats also 
rely heavily on the rank and status of incumbency , while 
using personal wealth and credit of candidates when the 
party is out of power . 
47 
The Republicans , on the other hand , consider program 
and ideology as being the most importan t .  They claim to 
support society ' s  upper socioeconomic ranks - -particularly 
those in finance , commerce , and industry- -who want conserva-
t ive policies and that have the ability to make political 
contributions . 
An overview of the data presented sugges t s  that incum­
bency and compe t itivenes s  have a great impact on how money is 
·raised. Challengers in the least marginal races receive the 
smallest amounts . Incumbents in c lose races and candidates 
for open seats receive the most .  
87c · 1 0 1 I . . t 124 ongre s s iona .uarter y ,  n c . , �· c i  . ,  p .  . 
Cll..\PTER I I I 
THE FULL MODEL 
This the sis replicates Gary C .  Jacobson ' s  analysis 
of the relat ionship between spending and con�ress ional 
election results using data from the 1980 congres sional 
elections . Jacobson specifically has s tated , "spending 
by the challenger has a substantial impact on election 
outcome s ,  whereas spending by incumbents has relative 
little effect� in congressional elections . 89 With this 
in mind the research variables will be explained . 
NOH- INCUMBENT CAMPAIGN FUNDS 
The most important factor · affecting how much a non-
incumbent will raise is the expectation of his chances of 
winninf, . According to Dawson and Zinsen, the participation 
motives of contributors ,  which they have coined as "invest-
ment motives , "  look for the apparent certainty of electoral 
result of a
·
candidat e . 90 This rational inve s tor will look 
at the future reward or benefit , weiehing the element o f  
89 Gary C .  Jacobson, op . cit . , p .  101 . 
90Paul A .  Dawson and JaJTles E .  Zinsen , "Political 
Finance and Partic ipation in Congressional Elections , "  The 
American Academ of Political and Social Sci·ences Vol .  425 
May , 7 , pp . - 7 • 
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risk, which should decrease if the probability of election 
. . 9 1  i s  certain. 
A major factor in this consideration is whether or 
not the challenger is oppos ing an incumbent . As was s tated 
in Chapter I, there are more ' margina l '  outcomes in non-
incumbent districts (open s e a t s )  than in districts with 
an incumbent running . As Mayhew has pointed out , open 
seats have become more competitive over t ime , but this same 
weakening of partisanship that put these people in off ice 
may in turn make it easier for a candidate with a locally 
weak party to win open seat s .  As was seen by the figures 
in Chapter I ,  open seats tend to attract more money , with 
nearly all of it spent on the election . 
Another key variable , other than the ability to 
raise money , that has a s trong impact on the election is 
the quality of the candidate and his popular appeal . At 
one extreme, the financiers will induce a likely prospect 
to run; on the other hand , some financiers feel lucky to 
get on a bandwagon of a popular person who can ' t  be stopped . 
Such an available candidate who does have these qualities 
92 wil l ,  by definition, attract financial support . 
To qualify the definition of a good candidate �s to 
obj ectively measure the variety of characterist ics that make 
up these ' quality candidates ' .  This in itself would be har d ,  
9 1 rb · d  · 
__ i_ • •  p .  7 2 .  
92 Alexander Hear d , �· c i t . , pp . 318-343.  
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if not impossible ; so for expedience of measurenent , these 
qualities will be determined by "previous electoral experi­
ence . 119 3  Candidates who have run for office and won "have 
valuable experience and contacts as wel l  as some minimal . 
skill in dealing with an electorate . . .  and non-incumbent 
congre s s ional candidate s who have previously won e l e c t ive 
off ice do raise significantly more money than those who 
have not . . .  these good candidates run selectively , that 
i s ,  when conditions suggest that their chances of winning 
are better . 11 94 
Table 16 lists the percentages of challengers that 
have held prior office before running for Congres s .  About 
half are considered good candidates , by this criterion , who 
run for open seats . These figures show that the percentage 
running for open seats is twice the .proportion challenging 
incumbent s .  So it may be stated that "well-qualified, well-
financed challengers oppose incumbents who seem vulnerable , 
either because of th.e partisan composi tion of their dis­
tricts or because of national partisan swings . • •95 These 
national trends in effec t ,  influence the amount of money 
that is made available to non-incumbent s ; the 1974 elections 
93 Gary C. Jacobson, �· cit . , pp . 107 . 
94Ibid. , p .  107 . 
95John R. Johanes and John C .  McAdams , "The Congres­
sional Incumbency Effect : I s  I t  Casework, Policy Compati­
bil ity , or Something Else? An Examination of the 1978 Elec­
tions , "  American Journal of Political Science 25 (Aug . 1981) , 
pp . 523 . 
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TABLE 16 
Percentage of Challengers That Have Held Prior 
Office Before Running For Congres s  
Democrats Republicans Total 
Challengers 
( 144) a 1972 2 1 . 5  _ 2 1 .  7 ( 17 5 )  ?. 1 . 6  (319) 
1974 38 . 3  ( 16 2 )  12 . 6  ( 159)  2 5 . 5  ( 321)  
1976 2 9 . 5  ( 122) 16 . 9  (207) 2 1 . 6  ( 329) 
Candidates 
For Open 
Seats 
1972 4 1 . 4  (58)  5 1 . 7  ( 58) 46 . 6  (116)  
1974 5 4 . 7 ( 5 3) 49 . 1  ( 5 3 )  5 1 . 9  ( 106) 
1976 60 . 0  (50)  38 . 1  (50) 5 9 . 0  ( 100) 
Note : Includes candidates with maj or party opposition only. 
aNumber of cases from which percentages were computed.  
Source : Congre s s ional Quarterly Weekly Reports , Special 
Pre-election Editions , 1972 , 1 9 7 4 ,  and 1 9 7 6 .  
brought out a large amount o f  experienced Democrats while 
1972 saw more experienced Republ icans . 
National tides also have an effect on individual 
congressmen, along with the state of the economy and Presi-
dential coattai l s .  But there are certain precautions that 
each incumbent may take to influence the probabil ity that 
a serious and wel l -financed challenge does not take place . 
One precaution i s  to keep the winning margin in the last 
election as high as possible ; this will dampen serious com­
petition in the future . Incumbents become targets when 
they do not reflect dis trict s entiments ! Po licies that 
offend local groups with national ties invite troub l e .  
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Similarl y ,  an incumbent who fails to use his perquisites 
to "communicate with constituents , or has lapses in per-
sonal morality , advanced age , s igns of ill  health or 
senility can suggest that he i s  losing his grip on the 
district and is ready for defeat'.' . 96 
To recapitulate : the ability of the challenger 
to raise money depends on the particular election year , 
electoral margins , and the behavior or lack of specific 
incumbent factors . If a challenger can use his experience 
coupled with political contributions , a serious battle may 
ensue even with the most entrenched candidate .  
INCUMBENT CAMPAIGN FUNDS 
It has been suggested by William Welch97 and Gary 
Jacobson98 that the more an incumbent spends , the worse he 
does in the election ; there i s  a "threshold beyond which 
money cannot be effectively used by a candidate to overcome 
the advantage (whatever it may be) of his opponent . 99  Thus 
the incumbent gauges his spending on the lev.el of spending 
by the chal lenger , which , in turn , reflects on his solici-
tation of funds . But , as discussed above , the incumbent 
can encourage or discourage good candidates from mobi lizing 
such resources .  
96Gary C .  Jacobson, 2.E.· cit . , p .  110 .  
97will iam P.  Welch, "The Economics of  Campaign 
Funds , "  Public Choice ( 1974) , pp.  83-9 7 .  
98 Gary C.  Jacobson , �· cit . , p .  105 . 
99w· 1 1 · P �1 1 h · 92 i iam . v e  c , 2.E.· cit . , p .  . 
Our basic objective i s  to better understand the 
effect of  money , with a number of other factors , on the 
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vot e .  From the candidate ' s  perspective , the campaign i s  
essentially the process o f  acquiring , converting and 
expending resources to reflect in votes .  If  we are to 
fully understand the vote , w� need to develop a model 
that takes into consideration the full range of  resources 
used by the candidates . But by doing thi s , we would con-
struct a model too complex to ascertain how each variable 
intertwines with another and the effect that each would 
have on another . 100 
Among resources , money is thought of  as a special 
value because it can be converted into other resource s .  
Because of  i t s  liquidity , the amount spent i s  a bel lweather 
on the many other resources used by a candidate . Yet there 
are other factors that have an impact on the vote that are 
less directly related to money . 
So the argument that incumbents can adjust their 
fund-raising and spending abilities i s  an important state-
ment on how money works in congressional elections and how 
it can be used in reforming congressional campaign finance 
regulations . 
lOOJohn P .  Owens and Edward C �  Olson, "Campaign 
Spending and the Electoral Process in California 1966- 7 4 , "  
Western Political Quarterly 30 ( 19 7 7 ) , p .  493 .  
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In the present study multiple regres s ion analysis 
will be used to produce a predictive �odel that will 
provide estimates of the effects  of a variety of inde­
pendent variables on the challenger ' s  vote and the level 
of spending by an incumbent in 209 congres sional districts 
in the 1980 elec tion . These variables are : 
1 .  CV Challenger ' s  share of  the two-party vot e .  101 
= 
2 .  IE 
= 
Incurnben t ' s expenditures , in dollar amounts .  
3 .  CE 
= 
Challenger ' s  expenditures ,  in dollar amounts . 
4 .  p = Challenger ' s  party ( 1  if  a Democrat , 0 i f  a 
Republican) . This variable serves chiefly as a control on 
short-term national trends towards favoring one party or 
another in any one election year ( this is expected to affect 
a candidate ' s  money-raising abi l i ty) . 
5 .  CPS = Challenger ' s  district party strength , meas ­
ured by the vote percentages won .by the challenger ' s  party ' s  
last candidate for the offic e .  This particular variable 
approximates the normal vote in which the relationship 
between party affiliation and vote (�hich is well documented 
by the University of Michigan ' s  survey research center ' s  
1950 ' s  and 1960 ' s  study on the normal vote) is controlled 
for . As in the case of  the challenger ' s  party , the chal­
lenger ' s  party s trength can also influence the candidate � s  
ability to raise money as well as the vot e .  
lOlThe data for each of  the variables are taken from 
Michae 1 Barone and Grant Uj if  us a ,  The Almanac ·of American 
Politics 1982 (Cambridg e ,  Mas s . :  Fine Print and Production , 
Inc . ,  1982) .  
6 .  IP = 1 i f  incumbent ran in a primary , 0 if not . 
This dummy variable represents additional spendiny, for the 
incumbent that will be reflected on the dat a ,  and must be 
controlled for . 
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7 .  YRS = Nur.lber of consecutive years of  House service . 
He must recognize advantages derived from length of service 
that translate into more experience and effectiveness in us ing 
the resources available to hiM. With this in mind the best 
way to operationalize incumbency is  by the number of years he 
s erved s ince it i s  a more precise measure that i s  sensitive to 
102 change . 
8 .  L = 1 if the incumbent i s  a Chairman or ranking 
member o f  a subconnnittee or holds a high leadership position in 
the House ,  0 otherwise .  The rais ing of political issues in the 
legislative arena , which increase legislative discretion , for 
the most part , i s  in the hands of connnittee chairmen and maj ority 
and minority leaders , They stand to receive More contributions 
than other legislators . The ereater the incur.:ibent power , the 
t . b . · 1 bl h .  l03 more con ri  utions are avai a e to im. 
THE STATISTICAL ANALYSIS 
In multiple regression analysi s , linear equations are 
produced in the following form: 
( I )  
102John R.  Owens and Edward C .  Olsen, 2.E.· cit . , p .  493 .  
103william P .  Welch , �· c it . , pp . 83-87 . 
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The CV term stands for the value of the dependent variab l e ,  
which i s  the challenger ' s  vote . Challenger expenditures ,  
incumbent expenditures ,  party , challeneer ' s  party s trength , 
(CE ,  IE , P ,  CPS) are the independnet variables or predictor 
variables . The ' b '  represents the best fitting ' least 
squares '  estimate of the changes in the dependent variable 
associated with one unit change in the given independent 
variabl e .  The ' a '  term or intercept i s  simply the predicted 
' y '  value when all of the indep�ndent variables are at zero 
value . The ' e '  term i s  the difference between the actual 
' y '  value and the predicted ' y '  value . 104 
We will be looking at each independent variable in 
relation to a standardized regression coefficient which is 
referred to as a beta weight . Working with beta weights 
enables one to s impl ify the regression equation since the 
constant ' a '  is set at zero . This allows one to compare the 
relative effects of two or more independent variables meas-
ured on different units .  Stated another way , s tandardized 
coefficients provide a way to compare the effect on the 
d d · bl h h · d d t · b l  has on i· t . 105 epen ent varia e t at eac in epen en varia e 
The firs t  hypothesis to be tested i s  that money i s  
more important t o  challengers than i t  is t o  incumbents in 
congres sional elections . The results are presented in Table 1 7 .  
104Michael S .  Lewis-Beck , · Applied Re�ress ion 
(Beverly Hil l s : Sage Univers ity Press ,  1980 . 
lOSNorman H .  Nie , e t .  al.  Statistical Package for 
the Social Sciences (New York : McGraw-Hill Book Company , 
19 75). 
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TABLE 17 
Effects of Campaign Spending in House Elections , 
1980 Estimates 
Challenger ' s  
Vote 
Challeneer ' s  
Expenditures 
Incumbent ' s  
Expenditures 
Party 
Challenger ' s  
Party 
Strength 
= a 
= bl 
= bz 
= b3 
= b 4 
Equation I 
Regress ion 
Coefficient 
15 . 34 
. 000027 
. 0000059 
- 2 . 5 7  
. 4602 
R2 = 
Significance 
No . of Cases 
. 598 
= . 000 
209 = 
Significance 
Level 
. 00 
. 00 
. 23 
. 02 
. 00 
Standardized 
Regress ion 
Coefficient 
. 37 4  
. 07 1  
- . 116 
. 48 1  
We find that the result s  sub s tantiate Jacobson ' s  findings 
that the elect ion outcome was af £ected more by the chal-
lengers ' expenditures than by the incumbent s '  spending. For 
the 1980 election the chal lenger i s  expected to gain . 2 7  
percent of the vote for every $1 0 , 000 he spends .  The gain 
is not as great as Jacobson ' s  1 . 0  percent for every $10 , 000 
spent , but the equation used here did not take into account 
high rates of inflation in the late 1 9 70 ' s ,  as he did . 
Incumbent expenditures also had a positive impact 
on the challenger ' s  vote , although the effect i s  very limited. 
Jacobson observed a very weak negative relationship . 
Although the sign of the coeffic ient i s  important , its 
lack of statistical s ignificance i s  of greater intere s t .  
My results indicate that incumbent spending has no appre­
ciable effect on the electoral outcome . One such factor 
responsible for this lack of significance is that incun-
5 8  
bents generally are known before the campaign begins . Con­
sequently , money spent by the incumbent during the election 
may do l ittle to increase his name recognition and chance 
of victory. On the other hand , challengers must brinr, 
their name and issue position before the electorate during 
the campaign , enabling them to make better use of campaign 
finances . Mann ' s  research produced suggestive findings 
that "most incumbents amass  an early lead over their chal.-
leneers based on an overwhelming advantage in public vis-
ibility ; this lead narrows as the challenger ' s  candidacy 
begins to penetrate the electorate ' s  consc�ousness , but is 
usually sufficiently large enough to insure victory in 
November . "106 
In the other control variables ,  Republican challen-
gers typically received an additional 2 . 57 percent of the 
two-party vot e ;  district party strength, which was calcu­
lated by the challenger ' s  party ' s  candidate in the last 
106Thomas Edward Mann, "Candidate Saliency and Con­
gressional Elections" (Ph . D .  dissertat:lon , University of 
Michigan , 19 7 7 ) , p .  107 in Gary C .  Jacobson , Xonei in 
Congressional Elections (New Haven : Yale Univers ity Pre s s ,  
198 ) ' p .  156. 
election had a substantial positive effect ,  as it did in 
Jacobson ' s  s tudy ,  on the election. All four variables 
explain about 60 percent of the variance in the outcome 
of House election s .  
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The next hypothesis to be tested is that incumbent s  
are able to adjust their fund raising and spending according 
to the perceived threat of the challenger . 107 The equation 
is as follows : 
IE = a + b1CE + b2P +b3CPS + b4IP + b5YRS 
+ b6PO + b7L + e (II)  
By analyzing the standardized regression coefficients in 
Table 18 , we find that the challenger ' s  expenditure variable 
exerts a positive influence on the dependent variable and 
explains by far the most variance in the equation , beta = . 4 5 .  
This conclusion parallels Jacobson ' s  findings on the 1972 , 
1974 , and 19 7 6  congressional elections in that i t ,  too , was 
the maj or positive explanatory factor on how the incumbents 
raise and spend money. Other findings such as the 1966-74 
study done by Owens and Olson have the same conclusion s .  
Furthermore ,  Table 1 8  ranks Challenger ' s  Party Strength (CPS) 
as second in influence while the Party variable (P) ls third 
and Prior Office (PO) fourth with all of them being positive 
and significant at the . 05 level . The variables work as 
expected according to the electoral threat the challenger 
l07G C J b . 114 ary . aco son , �- cit . , p .  . 
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TABLE 18 
Determinants of Campaign Spending by House Incumbents 
1980 Estimates 
Equation II 
Standardized 
Significance Rep,ression 
Coefficient Level Coefficient 
Incumbents 
Expe!lditure = a 4666 1 .  . 14 
Challenger ' s  · 
Expe?Jditure = b l . 398 . oo . 455 
Party = b2 3966 0 .  . 01 . 147 
Challenger ' s  
Party 
Streneth = b3 182 8 .  . 02 . 158 
Incumbent 
Primary-.:---
= 
b4 1 7 5 2 1 .  . 2 9  . 061  
Years = b5 -1707 . . 20 - . 099 
Prior 
Office = b6 32850 . . 05 . 11 7  
Leadership = b7 6 2 5 1 .  . 14 . 023 
R2 
= 
. 40 
Singificance 
= 
. 000 
No . of Cases = 209 
poses . For examp l e ,  if the challenger ' s  party ' s  vote in the 
last election was high, i f  the challenger held prior elec­
tive office or if he was ' a Democrat in 1980 , the incumbent 
... - .. 
spent mor e .  The longer an incumbent has been in office , the 
less he spent ; however , according to the data presented here , 
if he was a chairman or ranking member , he spent mor e .  This 
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should be expected because of the "New Right" campaign 
against the Democratic house le�dership in 1980 congres-
sional elections . 
The results of the two regressions stated previously 
are only tentative , since the connection between spending 
and vo te s  may be reciprocal . In other words good candidates 
may attract both money and votes , rather than money attract­
ing the votes for the candidate.  Also "votes and expendi-
tures may vary together because more money is contributed 
to candidates who are expected to do wel l . 11108 The direc-
tion of causation goes in two directions ; the a�ount spent 
by the incumbent affects the outcome of the electlon and 
the perceived outcome affects the incumbent ' s  ability to 
raise and spend money. Hence , a simple single equation 
model specifying incumbent expenditures as a function of 
challenger ' s  expenditures , party , challenger ' s  party strength , 
incumbent ' s  primary , years , prior office and leadership is 
incomplete . Therefore the following relationships are hypo� 
thes ized : 
CE = f(P , CPS , PO , YRS , EV) 
IE = f ( ? , CPS , PO , YRS , IP , EV , CE) 
CV 
= 
f ( CE , IE , P , CPS)  
EV ·-- cv 
where EV 
= 
expected challenger ' s  vot e .  
l08Ibid . , p .  1 3 6 .  
The challenger ' s  vote i s  a function of both challenger ' s  
and incumbent 1 s  expenditures .  However , the expenditures 
of both challenger and incumbent are influenced by the 
expected vote of  the challenger , which i s  approximated 
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by his  actual vote . Hence the reciprocal relationship : 
expenditures affect the vote while the vote influences the 
expenditures . 
If this hypothesis is true , then the coefficients 
estimated earlier in the s iMple linear regre s s ions are 
biased and inconsistent . A biased estimate calculated from 
a sample would not b e  expected to be equal to the true 
coefficient.uI the population. An inconsistent estimate 
would imply that a large sample would not yield a more 
accurate es timate. 109 To correct these problems , the true 
coefficients must be e s t imated by a s imultaneous equation 
system. 
When one or more endogenous variables are included 
as independent variables in the syste�, these endogenous 
variables mqy be correlated with the error term. An endo-
genous variable is one whose value must be explained or pre-
dieted by the model . In this case challenger ' s  expenditure , 
incurnbent ' s  expenditure and challenger ' s  vote are endogenous 
s ince their values are predicted by the equations in the 
mode l .  An exogenous variable need not be explained s ince 
it is determined outside of the model and is fixed when the 
lQgT h W . H E . An I d An e - ei u ,  conometrics : ntro uctory a-
lys is (Baltimore : University Park Pres s ,  1973). 
endogenous variables are known . In this cas e ,  party , 
challenger ' s  party strength, prior office , years and 
incumbent primary are exogenous variables uncorrelated 
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with the error t erm so the ordinary least-squares can then 
be applied to yield cons istent e s t imates of the b ' s .  The 
e s t imation method chosen i s  two - s tage least- squar e s , since 
the system is overidentified according to the order condi­
tion of identifiability or counting rule (it mus t be j ust  
identified or  overidentified to be  acceptable for two- stage 
least squares) . That i s ,  for each equation the number of 
exogenous variables not included in the equation (K) exceeds 
the number of endogenous variables  that are included (M) 
minus one . For example , in the first  equation , there is one 
exogenous variab l e ,  incumbent primary, that i s  not included 
in the equation . Only one endogenous is included ,  namely , 
challenger ' s  expenditures . Therefore , K = 1 and M = 1 ,  so  
K M - 1 and the first  equation i s  overidentified ; this is 
the minimum test of acceptibility . Two-stage least-squares 
simply applies ordinary least-squares in succes sion. For 
the model at hand,  the parameters of the challenger ' s  expen­
diture and incumbent ' s  expenditure equations are estimated 
by ordinary least-squares . The results obtained are used 
to compute estimates of  the challenger ' s  expenditures and 
incumbent ' s  expenditures , which are then utilized to esti­
mate the parameters for the challenger ' s  vote equation by 
ordinary least - s quares . 
The equations are as follows : 
NCE = a + b1P + b2CPS + b3Po + b4YRS 
+ b5IP + e 
NIE = a + b1P + b2CPS + b3Po + b4YRS 
+ b5IP + e 
CV = a +  b1NCE + h2NIE + b3P + 
b4CPS + e 
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(III)  
( IV) 
(V) 
The first step is to regress the endogenous explanatory 
variables , here referred to as New Challenger ' s  Expendi­
tures and New Incumbent Expenditures , as a function of all  
of the exogenous variables and obtain estimates of the b ' s .  
These b ' s  are then used to calculate estimated Challenger ' s  
Expenditures and Incumbent ' s  E�enditures ; these estimates 
are purged of their correlation with the error term. Con­
sequently , these estimated Challenger ' s  Expenditures and 
Incumbent ' s  Expenditures can be used to obtain consistent 
(although not unbiased) estimates of the parameters (b ' s ) 
for the Challenger ' s  Vote equation .  
The results obtained by this methodology are pre­
sented in Table 1 9 .  The two- stage least-square .r esults are 
not dramatically different than those obtained with s imple 
ordinary least squares . Excluding challenger ' s  expenditure , 
the challenger ' s  party strength � prior offic e ,  and party 
were the most important determinants of incumbent ' s  expendi­
ture in both regressions . Once again , this is  because the 
incumbent gauges his spending according to the perceived 
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TABLE 19 
Effects of Campaign Spending in 
1980 Estimates 
House Elections , 
(Two-Stage Least Squares) 
No . of Cases 209 
Standardized 
Regression Significance Regress ion 
Coefficient Leve ls Coefficient 
New Incumbent 
Expenditures = a 11058 . 74 
R2 
= 
Party 
= 
bl 26994 . 12 . 100 . 25 Challenger ' s  Sig.  
= 
Party Strength 
= 
b2 3868 . 00 . 334 . 000 
Prior Office 
= 
b3 67662 . 00 . 241 
Years = bl� - 1582 . 17 - . 09 3  
Incumbent 
Primary 
= 
b5 2 3013  . 2 1  . 079  
New Challenger 
Expenditures 
= 
a 95706 . 01 
R2 = Party 
= 
bl -29689 . 13 - . 096 . 2 8  Challenger ' s  Sig.  
= 
. 000 Party Strength 
= b2 5 2 1 7  . 00 . 394 
Prior Off ice b3 86446 . 00 . 269  
Years 
= 
b4 -269 . 84 - . 013  
Incumbent 
Primary 
= 
b5 13767  . 5 1  . 042 
Challenger ' s  
Vote = a 1 9  . 00 
R2 = New Challenger ' s  
. 49 Expenditures 
= 
bl . 000069 . 12 . 503  Si:g.  
= 
New Incumbent 
.iOOO Expenditures 
= 
b2 - . 000032 . 54 - . 194 
Party = b3 - . 198 . 95 - . 009 
Challenger ' s  
Party Strength 
= 
b4 . . 389 . 00 . 407 
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threat that the challenger pose s .  This threat should be 
greater if the challenger held prior office or if his 
party is strong in the distr i c t .  Also, all coefficients 
had the same signs in both regress ions . 2 Of course , the R 
is lower in the two-stage least-squares because challenger ' s  
expenditure i s  not included . 
Challenger ' s  expenditures were also found to be 
greatly influenced by challenger ' s  party strength and prior 
office . Challengers that have held prior office are more 
likely to have the connections and minimum abilities neces­
sary to  garner campaign contributions . Also because of 
district party strengths , more money would be available to 
a challenger running in a "friendly" district . 
In both regressions ( s imple linear and two-stage 
least squares ) , challenger ' s  party strength and challenger ' s  
expenditures were found to be the most important determinant 
of the challenger ' s  vote . However , the two-stage least­
square analysis did not yield a significant relation for 
challenger ' s  expenditure . Likewise , as expected , incumbent ' s  
expenditures were not found to be  significant . However , the 
two - stage least square results indicate spending by the 
challenger to be more effective , with R l 0 , 000 yielding an 
additonal . 69 percent of the vote . Increased expenditure 
by the incumbent of $10 , 000 decreases the challenger ' s  vote 
by . 32 percent giving a net impact of . 34 percent gain for 
the challenger.  These results still  show campaign spending 
to be less effective than Jacobson ' s  s tudy. 
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A problem with the results is severe multicollinearity 
between chal lenger ' s  expenditure and incumbent ' s  expenditure . 
Multicollinearity exists when two or more independent vari­
ables are highly correlated . It may cause a variable to appear 
to be insignificant when , in fact , it is s ignificant . This i s  
to be expected since it has been hypothe sized that incumbent 
spending i s  a direct reaction to spendinB by the challenger . 
This could be responsible for the lack of s ignificance of chal­
lenger ' s  expenditure upon challenger ' s  vot e .  One way to deal 
with this problem is to drop one of the correlated independent 
variables from the analysis . This was done and the results are 
presented in Table 2 0 .  In this case , both challenger ' s  expendi­
ture and challenger ' s  party strength were found to be  s i gnifi­
cant determinants of the challenger ' s  share of the vot e .  Once 
again, Republican challengers had no s ignificant advantage over 
their Democratic counterparts . 
·coNCLUS ION 
In conclusion, it has been determined that incumbent 
candidates spending habits are strongly affected by the expendi­
tures of their challengers . It follows , then, that challenger ' s  
expenditures are more important in determining the outcome of 
the election . In equation I ,  rny results substantiate Jacobson ' s  
findings that the election outcome was primarily affected by 
the challenger ' s  expenditure s .  However , the increase in the 
challenger ' s  vote attributed to an increase in spending was 
only . 2 7  percent for every $10 , 000 in my s tudy , compared to 
1 . 0  percent in Jacobson ' s  work. 
TABLE 20 
Effects of Challenger ' s  Campaign Spending in 
House Elections 1980 
(Second-Stage Equation Omitting Hew Incumbent 
Expenditures ; . No . of Cases 209) 
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Standardized 
Regression Significance Regress ion 
Challenger ' s  
Vote 
New 
Challenger ' s  
Expenditure 
Party 
Challenger ' s  
Party 
Strength 
= a 
= bl 
= b2 
= b3 
Coefficient Level Coefficient 
17 . 00 
. 000043 . oo . 316 
- 1 . 845 . 15 - . 083 
. 390 . 00 . 408 
R2 = . 48 
Significance = . oo 
In regard to equation I I ,  my results parallel 
Jacobson ' s  in that chalienger ' s  expenditures are the 
most important determinant of incumbent ' s  expenditures . 
Als o ,  both studies indicate that the longer an incumbent 
has been in office , the less he spends ; chairmen and 
ranking members tend to spend more .  
Like Jacobson , the results o f  my two-stage least­
square regression do not differ dramatically from the ordi­
nary least-squares . In my analysis equations I I I ,  IV, and 
V ,  challenger ' s  expenditure and challenger ' s  party strength 
were found to be the most important determinant of the 
challerger ' s  vote. Jacobson found this to be the most 
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important determinant of the challenger ' s  vote . Jacobson 
found this to be true in the 19 72 election .  However , in 
the 1974 election , he found challenger party s trength and 
party to be the mos t  s ignificant independent variables 
while in 197 6  challenger expenditures and incumbent expendi­
tures were the most important . It appears as though there 
is no s ingle variable that cons i stently explains the 
challenger ' s  party vot e .  
When incumbent ' s  expenditures are excluded from the 
analysi s  due to multicollinear i ty , my results indicate that 
challenger ' s  party strength i s  the most s ignificant deter­
minant of challenger ' s  vot e ,  followed by challenger ' s  expendi­
ture . This is consistent with Jacobson ' s  1 9 7 2  and 19 76 
results .  However , his 1974 results found party to be the 
most s ignificant independent variab l e ,  followed by challen­
ger ' s  expenditure. 
In general ,  challenger ' s  expenditures tend to be a 
significant determinant of the challenger ' s  vot e .  Yet , 
expenditures do not yield large changes in the vote totals  
o f  the challenger . My s tudy indicates that challengers gain 
less than 1 percent of the vote for every $10 , 000 they spend , 
while Jacobson found a gain of about 1 percent or even 
s l ightly more.  
With less than 1 percent of the vote gained for 
every $10 , 000 spent by the challenger , it becomes clear 
that elections are not likely to be competitive unless 
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they are adequately financed . A conservative figure would 
be around $250 , 000 for a full - s cale House election. If 
competitive elections are a part of the democratic process 
then we must seriously consider public financing of elec­
tion s .  
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